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National Security Personnel System 




This report addresses the implementation of NSPS in the Department of Defense (DoD) from the time of enactment to 
the point where the last NSPS regulations were published at the end of the George W. Bus Administration. Three 
distinct temporal periods are identified in the implementation phase of NSPS history. The initial DoD implementation 
strategy immediately following enactment of the FY 2004 Defense Authorization Act was led by the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness). It focused on rapid deployment of a new personnel system, 
including pay for performance and pay banding, based on a prior study of best practices. In Spring, 2004 the 
Department decided on a “strategic pause” in the face of implementation issues and criticism from the Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM) . During this period, the Department developed a new structure to facilitate 
implementation and address the OPM’s concerns.  This strategic pause was followed by the third period of 
implementation with the formation of the Program Executive Office for NSPS. Implementation of NSPS was impacted 
by strong opposition from public sector unions, increasing congressional oversight, and by court cases brought by the 
unions that slowed and narrowed DoD’s roll out of NSPS. Nevertheless, the Department persisted. The final portion of 
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Forward 
This report is a continuation of a series of studies begun in 2005 to examine an important period of policy 
formulation, enactment, and implementation in federal civilian personnel management.  Earlier studies 
focused on enactment of the personnel management authorities for the new Department of Homeland 
Security1 (DHS) and enactment of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) for the Department of 
Defense (DoD).2 These studies and subsequent papers3 argued that the events of 9/11 served as a triggering 
mechanism that allowed the Bush Administration to design and achieve Congressional approval for 
significant federal personnel management policy changes.  These policy decisions were made for reasons of 
national security and were adopted in non-traditional ways by the Congress, written in general language 
leaving the details for later, and adopted over strong opposition from public sector unions.  Though the 
formulation and adoption of these new policies was successfully managed, there was a lack of overall political 
or policy consensus among the usual actors in the federal personnel management. We suggested in our 
previous research that this lack of consensus could eventually affect the successful implementation of both 
the DHS system and NSPS.   
 
This report addresses the implementation of NSPS in the Department of Defense from the time of enactment 
to the point where final regulations on NSPS staffing and employment were printed in the Federal Register in 
January, 2009.  It examines the processes used to design and implement the new system under the broad 
authorities granted in the legislation, and it reports on the legal cases brought by the unions which affected 
the scope and substance of NSPS implementation.  To assemble this report, we reviewed nearly 500 public 
documents, interviewed key participants, and consulted previous interview transcripts provided by the DoD 
historian. 
 
“Transforming is not an event.  There is no moment at which the Department of Defense moves 
from being untransformed to ‘transformed.’ We will need to be continuously looking for ways to 
improve both the military and civilian sides of the department.”  
--Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense4 
 
Introduction 
Secretary Rumsfeld viewed NSPS as a key element of defense transformation.  DoD consistently emphasized 
the new civilian personnel management system as part of a “total force” approach to fight the Global War on 
Terror.  Rumsfeld argued that NSPS would make the Department flexible enough to respond to the ever 
changing global environment.5  Despite the Department’s rhetorical emphasis on the importance of NSPS for 
national security, it was not clear in November 2003 how the policy would be implemented.  In the beginning, 
the policy had little in the way of a specific design for implementation—the legislation that enacted NSPS gave 
broad discretion to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, with 
limited Congressional oversight.  Congress had imposed limited structural conditions on how NSPS should be 
                                                                    
1 Douglas A. Brook, Cynthia L. King, David W. Anderson and Joshua P. Bahr, Legislating Civil Service Reform: The Homeland Security Act of 
2002, Naval Postgraduate School Technical Report Series NPS-CDMR-HR-06-006, June 2006. 
2 Douglas A. Brook, Cynthia L. King, Shane Prater and Eric Timmerman, National Security Personnel System: A History of the Creation and 
Enactment of the NSPS Legislation, Center for Defense Management Reform Technical Report Series, December 2008. 
3 See Douglas A. Brook and Cynthia L. King, “Federal Personnel Management Reform: From the Civil Service Reform Act to National 
Security Reforms,” Review of Public Personnel Administration, vol. 28 (September 2008): 205-211; Douglas A. Brook and Cynthia L. 
King, “Civil Service Reform as National Security,” Public Administration Review, May-June 2007: 397-405; andDouglas A. Brook and 
Cynthia L. King, “Legislating Innovation in Human Capital Management: Lessons From The Department of Homeland Security,” in 
Hannah Sistare and Terry Buss, eds., Innovations in Human Capital Management (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2009): 277-291. 
4 Donald Rumsfeld, “A 21st-Century DoD,” Wall Street Journal, November 24, 2003. 
5 Rumsfeld 
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designed and implemented, including such issues as safeguarding employees’ rights and ensuring that the 
system and its implementation was “fair, credible, and transparent.”6  The Department’s implementation 
strategy evolved and changed over time. 
 
There are three distinct temporal periods following enactment of NSPS during which DoD utilized different 
implementation strategies to confront the obstacles and challenges faced by the Department.  Phase one, or 
the first period of implementation led by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and 
Readiness), was the initial DoD implementation strategy that immediately followed enactment of the FY 2004 
Defense Authorization Act.  Phase two, the next period, began in spring, 2004, when the Department decided 
on a “strategic pause” in the face of implementation issues and criticism from the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM). During the strategic pause period, the Department tried to regroup and develop a new 
structure to facilitate implementation and address the concerns expressed by OPM.  Following the strategic 
pause, the third period is characterized by the formation of the Program Executive Office (PEO), an office 
designed to orchestrate NSPS implementation.  Finally, in Phase three, NSPS faced the most challenges, during 
which the PEO had to continuously adjust the implementation strategy and timetable.  
National Defense Authorization Act FY 2004: A starting point 
The legislation that authorized NSPS gave the Secretary of Defense and the Director of OPM wide joint 
discretion for the design and implementation of the new personnel system, but it did have a few specific 
guidelines for DoD and OPM to follow.  The legislation mandated that the design of the system be a “fair, 
credible and transparent employee performance appraisal system.”7  For the implementation of NSPS, it 
required a “means for ensuring that adequate agency resources are allocated for the design, implementation, 
and administration of the performance management system.”8  It also mandated that there be “a means for 
ensuring employee involvement” and that “adequate training and retraining for supervisors, managers, and 
employees” be provided.9  Later, the employee involvement guidelines became key points of debate over the 
efficacy and value of NSPS.  Federal employee labor unions worked to stop the implementation of NSPS on the 
grounds that DoD had broken these statutory obligations, and the unions claimed to have been marginalized 
and ignored by DoD.  Unions first took their case to the judicial branch through a series of court cases.  After 
the majority in Congress shifted following the 2006 midterm elections, the unions gained traction in their 
lobbying efforts for Congress to constrain and potentially abolish NSPS.   
 
Phase One: A False Start (November 24, 2003 – March 11, 2004) 
The design: following “Best Practices”  
The initial implementation strategy followed the statutory requirements and Task Force recommendations 
from the Best Practices Initiative.  The Best Practices Task Force was directed by the office of Dr. David S. C. 
Chu, the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness). It was chartered to “compile the most 
promising human resources practices in the government, both within and outside the Department, that would 
form the basis for a new human resources management system suited to DoD’s national security 
challenges.”10 The Best Practices Task Force examined nine demonstration projects and two alternative 
personnel demonstration projects,11 and it provided recommendations in the following areas: 1) pay banding; 
                                                                    
6 Congressional Research Service (CRS), “Pay for Performance: The National Security Personnel System,” CRS Report for Congress, 
(September 17, 2008), 4. 
7 CRS (September 17, 2008), 4. 
8 CRS (September 17, 2008) 
9 CRS (September 17, 2008), 16. 
10 DoD, Assessment of Existing Civilian Personnel Demonstration Authorities, (Washington, DC: July 2003), 7. 
11 OSD. Federal Register, Vol. 68, No. 63, 16120. 
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2) classification; 3) hiring and appointment; 4) pay-for-performance; 5) sabbatical authority; 6) volunteer 
service; and 7) reduction in force procedures.12  Chu described the Best Practices initiative as DoD’s effort to 
“boil down the best human resources management concepts and practices from those in and outside of the 
Department,” and a plan “to expand tested personnel flexibilities through the Department.”13  The Best 
Practices Initiative was intended to serve as a “detailed blueprint for a new system of hiring, assigning, 
rewarding, and replacing employees,”14 and it became the basis for the initial design for NSPS.15 
 
The initial design of NSPS introduced two key design features that remained, in varying forms, as core to the 
system: pay banding and pay-for-performance.  The Department used the structure of pay banding from Best 
Practices, but it was unclear how the General Schedule (GS) pay structure would convert to the NSPS pay 
bands.16  Under the initial design of NSPS, employees would be classified on the pay schedule by three broad 
pay bands called “career groups” (CG) based on their job description: CG1) Professional and Administrative 
Management; CG2) Engineering, Scientific, Medical Support; and, CG3) Business and Administrative 
Support.17  Within each of the career groups, there would be four pay bands.  In a departure from the GS 
system, NSPS pay bands would not be based on length of employment, but would instead be based on job 
performance and qualifications. Among other perceived advantages, proponents asserted that this system 
would allow the Department to offer incentives to recruit well-qualified candidates by offering them higher 
salaries than would be allowed for new employees under GS. 
 
The pay-for-performance feature of the initial design was a means to recognize high-performing employees 
through economic incentives of higher annual salary increases and annual bonuses.  Pay-for-performance 
was based on the model used by the private sector.  Each year employees and supervisors under NSPS would 
complete an evaluation process, during which employee and supervisor would agree on Department or 
Agency mission-based objectives that the employee would work towards over the course of the year.  At the 
end of the year, the supervisor would evaluate how well the employee performed in seven areas: 1) technical 
competence/problem solving; 2) cooperation/teamwork; 3) communication; 4) customer care; 5) resource 
management; 6) leadership/supervision; and 7) contribution to mission.18 The scores would be weighted out 
of 100 and then converted to a score from 1-5 indicating the employee’s overall performance where a “1” was 
unsatisfactory performance and a “5” was a role-model.  The rating received by an employee would 
determine annual pay increases: an employee who received a “1” would receive no increase in pay and an 
employee receiving a “5” would receive the largest increase.19  Employees who performed well would also 
receive bonuses that would be based on a complicated formula that determined an employee’s “performance 
payout” using the performance score.  An employee’s performance payout is a share of a unit’s “pay pool”—
group “of employees who work in an organization and share funding for performance payouts.”20 Each 
employee would be in only one pay pool at a time.   
NSPS initial implementation strategy 
The initial strategy was to get NSPS implemented as quickly as possible using Best Practices as a guide.  The 
outlined strategy was released in November 2003, and it included an estimated timetable and broad strategy 
                                                                    
12 DoD, Assessment of Existing Civilian Personnel Demonstration Authorities, (Washington, DC: July 2003), 8. 
13 House Subcommittee, Transforming the DoD, 15, 19 
14 Senate Subcommittee, Overlooked Asset, 58. 
15 Ginger Groeber (former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy), in phone interview with Dr. Douglas A. 
Brook, Dr. Cynthia L. King, Maj Shane Prater, and CPT Eric Timmerman, August 20, 2007. 
16 Rebecca L. Davies, “Department of Defense National Security Personnel System: The transition to Pay for Performance,” Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Thesis ( June 2004), 37 
17 OSD, 2004,3. 
18Davies, 38. 
19 Davies, 39. 
20 NSPS, “Pay Pool Process at a Glance,” (June 2006), accessible online at 
http://www.cpms.osd.mil/nsps/docs/paypoolbrochure062006.pdf, (accessed on August 5, 2009). 
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for implementation.21  The strategy called for complete cooperation and coordination with OPM, but it didn’t 
outline the process for that coordination or how they could achieve it.  Additionally, the process called for 
employees and their representatives to collaborate with the Department and be involved in the design of 
NSPS regulations.  Formal discussions with employee representatives were expected to begin in early 
December 2003 and statutorily had to occur within 60 days of enactment.22  The Department set up working 
groups “to look at the labor employee relations aspects of NSPS, which had not been designed.”23  DoD 
estimated that NSPS implementation would cost $158 million up to 2008. The Department did not seek any 
additional funding for NSPS implementation; instead, it intended to shift money within the existing budget to 
cover all transition costs.24  This initial strategy was entirely focused on getting NSPS implemented as quickly 
as possible.25 
 
Even though the Department was focused on a speedy implementation, the timetable was continuously 
changing (see Appendix A for a timeline of NSPS implementation). Chu said that DoD’s initial theory was 
“deploy now,” and all efforts were made to implement NSPS within the shortest timetable.26  Chu was 
certainly not alone in his goal to move rapidly—the desire to implement the policy as quickly as possible 
originated from Secretary Rumsfeld himself.27  The initial timetable was very aggressive and was created 
without input from OPM or employee representatives.  In this initial strategy, implementation of NSPS would 
be activated once performance management systems and training were in place, activities that were expected 
to occur early in 2004.  According to the strategy, after the final NSPS regulations were published, DoD would 
implement NSPS by converting its employees in phases beginning April 2004.28  According to Secretary Chu, 
the initial phase would convert 300,000 civilian GS employees to NSPS by October 1, 2004.  The original 
estimate was that it would take less than two years to convert the bulk of DoD civilians to NSPS.29 When 
discussing his strategy of a quick deployment, Chu explained, “we should not be afraid to step on people’s 
toes, but, of course, don’t stomp on them just to be vicious.”30 
 
The NSPS Implementation Office was established December 1, 2004 and was charged with the task of 
designing and implementing NSPS within the desired two-year timetable.  The Office was headed by Bradley 
Bunn, who reported to Ginger Groeber, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy. It 
consisted of staff on detail from the Department of Defense Civilian Personnel Management Service (CPMS) 
and from other DoD offices. Bunn’s job was to get the system implemented: “I was selected primarily because 
the focus at the time was implementation of the system.  It was not heavily focused on design at that point.”31  
The Office was meant to create the training for management, employees, and supervisors, as well as to 
determine the composition and date of each implementation wave.32 
 
At this point, there appears to have been limited or no collaboration or communication between the 
Implementation Office and the service components or employees.  In her June 2004 MIT thesis, Rebecca 
Davies critiqued the lack of strategic planning: “during my research period, I found that very little information 
on NSPS is flowing from the NSPS Program Office to the Services and in turn to their departments and field 
                                                                    
21 U.S. Office of Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense (CPP), NSPS: National Security Personnel System, National Security Personnel System: 
Opening Doors for Defense Transformation: November 2003 (November 24, 2003). 
22 ODUSD (CPP), NSPS, “Opening Doors for Defense Transformation,” PowerPoint presentation, (November 2003).  
23 Bradley Bunn (Program Executive Officer, NSPS). Interview by Diane Putney (NSPS Office, Arlington, VA: September 12, 2008). 
24 Stephen Barr, “Defense, Homeland Security Proceed with Pay and Personnel Reorganizations,” Washington Post, (February 4, 2004). 
25 Sharon Seymour Interview 
26 Dr. David S. C. Chu (former Under Secretary of Defense of Personnel and Readiness), Interview by Diane T. Putney (RAND Office, 
Arlington, VA: March 25, 2009). 
27 Bunn Interview  
28 Refer to Bunn, Chu, and Curry Interviews 
29U.S. Congressional Research Services. CRS Report for Congress, Pay-for-Performance: The National Security Personnel System, Wendy 
Ginsberg, Order Code RL34673 (September 17, 2008), 4. 
30 Chu Interview 
31 Bunn interview 
32 Bunn Interview 
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activities.  The Department should address in the strategic plan a means to get the Services involved ‘up front 
and early.’”33  Davies also argued that for NSPS implementation to be successful, DoD “must develop and 
coordinate a comprehensive NSPS strategic plan that includes a detailed program schedule, an appropriate 
budget, and an independent risk assessment.”34  
 
One problem raised in two interviews by the DoD Historian was that the initial strategy was conducted 
almost entirely through internal communication and made little allowance for substantive input from labor 
representatives or OPM.35 Rebecca Davies heavily criticized the Department’s communication with 
employees and the public, noting that the original website contained only basic information and was “far from 
comprehensive.” She went on to argue that, to make the implementation successful, DoD would have to create 
a new comprehensive website that would “generate more interest, create more discussion, and ultimately 
result in earlier involvement and acceptance by managers and employees.” 36  Bunn’s description of the initial 
strategy supports the criticism that the Department was not concerned with input to the system’s design: 
“this wasn’t really about policy design; this was about implementing a system that had already been designed, 
which was Best Practices.”37 During this initial strategy, the Department employed the services of a public 
relations firm to develop strategies for communicating with employees, but after the strategic pause phase 
the PEO “pretty much got rid of them” and hired Joyce Frank from the Air Force to take over communication 
strategies.38 
 
The Implementation Office itself was improvised.  Timothy Curry, Executive Director, Labor Management and 
Employee Relations at the DoD, said the Office had no central location for staff: “we were putting them 
wherever we had any empty space,” which meant that there were staff members scattered throughout the 
floors of Federal buildings.39   
 
The most pressing task for the Implementation Office was to draft the proposed NSPS Human Resources (HR) 
and Labor Relations (LR) regulations for review by employee representatives by the statutory deadline.  
Despite the importance of requirement, Curry acknowledged that DoD “didn’t have anybody initially doing 
labor and employee relations,” and so he filled in the role,  calling himself  “two-hatted.”40  In December 2003, 
Curry initiated a labor relations work group to brainstorm the design of NSPS LR.   
The unions 
Labor unions representing Federal government employees have been key players in any efforts to reform the 
Federal civil service since the John F. Kennedy administration acknowledged certain bargaining rights 
through executive order.41  Employees’ rights were codified into law under Chapter 71 of Title 5 of the US 
Code with enactment of the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA). Federal employee unions cannot strike and 
are limited on what is negotiable for collective bargaining purposes. Curry noted, “anything that’s specifically 
provided for by law already cannot be bargained over, and probably the biggest example is pay.”42  Also, 
unions may not bargain over things that fall under “management rights” in the labor relations statute; this 
                                                                    
33 Davies, 53 
34 Davies, 53 
35 Sanders Interview, Seymour Interview 
36 Davies, 54 
37 Bunn Interview 
38 Bunn Interview 
39 Curry Interview 
40 Timothy F.  Curry (Executive Director, Labor Management and Employee Relations, Department of Defense), Interview by Diane T. 
Putney, (NSPS Office, Arlington, VA: July 30, 2008). 
41 Executive Order 10988: Robert Tobias said in a speech that this executive order launched the “golden age” of labor organizing in the 
federal sector. (Robert Tobias, Speech at “FLRA 20th Anniversary Luncheon,” (June 14, 1999), accessible online at 
http://www.flra.gov/reports/20yr_sp1.html (accessed July 29, 2009).) 
42 Curry Interview 
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includes decisions to hire, fire, and assign work to employees.43  Supervisors, managers, and personnel 
specialists can never be represented by unions, and certain employees whose work directly supports DoD 
national security missions may also be excluded. Curry estimated that about 60 percent of the DoD workforce 
(about 450,000 employees) is unionized and is represented by 45 unions and about 1,600 local bargaining 
units.44   
 
The Federal employee unions have been vocal opponents of NSPS.  Unions were suspicious of the George W. 
Bush Administration from its outset when President Bush revoked President Clinton’s executive order on 
labor management partnerships.45 The unions were suspicious of how the Department was designing and 
implementing NSPS.  In the 2003 American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) presidential 
elections, John Gage beat incumbent Robert (Bobby) Harnage on the issue that Harnage did not “do enough to 
stop the Department from getting the NSPS legislative authority.”46  
 
The legislation did not specify which unions the Department needed to consult during the design phase.  At 
the time, 8 of the 45 unions had national consultation rights (NCR), meaning they had the right “to be 
consulted on agency-wide regulations before they were promulgated.”47For the first meeting, on January 22, 
2004, the Department decided to invite only the NCR unions plus one union representing the others. 
According to Curry, “there was a strong desire to deal only with the national consultation rights unions,” but 
after complaints from the excluded unions, DoD decided it would be best to invite all unions.48  In subsequent 
meetings, however, all unions were invited. Curry said that the first meeting went okay, but “veiled 
statements by one union official in particular suggested if we didn’t play nice with them, dangerous things 
could happen.”49  
 
The unions publicly voiced their opposition to the system immediately after the Department issued the 
“National Security Personnel System Pre-Collaboration Labor Relations System Options” on February 6, 
2004.50 The proposal highlighted in the memo was pre-decisional and was intended to outline possibilities for 
a labor relations policy in order to facilitate talks with union leaders at a scheduled February 26-27, 2004, 
meeting between the Department, OPM, and employee representatives. Union leaders viewed the proposal as 
a direct attack on employees’ rights to organize and bargain collectively, and they perceived a number of of 
what they called “union busting” clauses.51  The proposal had a clause that would allow the Department to 
waive collective bargaining rights in times of national security emergencies, and an additional clause 
proposed to disallow employees from attending union-related meetings during the work day.52  Another 
provision that angered union leaders was one that would allow a “fee for service” option that enabled 
employees to solicit the representation and aid of a union for singular incidences, but didn’t require them to 
                                                                    
43 Curry Interview 
44 Curry Interview 
45 President Bush dissolved President Clinton’s EO 12871 as amended by EO 12983 and EO 13156 on February 17, 2001. (White House 
Press Release, “Revocation of Executive Order and Presidential Memorandum Concerning Labor-Management Partnerships,” (February 
17, 2001), accessible online at www.arguard.org/hro/docs/18.doc (accessed July 29, 2009)  
46 Curry Interview; Chu also discussed the AFGE election in his interview: “Mr. Gage ran on the slogan that Mr. Harnage was being too 
nice to us [DoD].” 
47 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, “Labor-Management Relations Glossary,” accessible at 
http://www.opm.gov/LMR/glossary/glossaryn.asp (accessed 26 December 2009). 
48 At the time of the meetings Curry says there were seven unions that had national consultation rights and ten had NCR by 2008. See 
Curry Interview 
49 Curry Interview 
50 DoD,“National Security Personnel System Pre-Collaboration Labor Relations System Options,” (February 6, 2004) accessible online at 
http://www.fed-fop.org/nsps/nsps_precollaboration_options.pdf.  See Appendix C for the DoD Options. See Appendix D for the unions’ 
response to and analysis of the proposal. 
51 John Gage quoted in: Christopher Lee, “Employees to Protest Pentagon Labor Plan,” Washington Post, (February 10, 2004). 
52 Shawn Zeller, “Unions Object to Pentagon Labor-Management Proposal,” Government Executive Magazine, (February 6, 2004), accessed 
online at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0204/020604sz1.htm (accessed: February 7, 2004). 
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be union members.53  AFGE President John Gage said that DoD’s proposal was “a union-busting approach to 
collective bargaining and labor relations,”54 and he pledged to oppose NSPS and to lobby Congress to “block 
the first step to the wholesale destruction of the civil service system.”55 AFGE was also concerned with 
provisions that would allow an agency to conduct reductions in force without considering veterans 
preference, and that would eliminate all provisions of the Department’s old labor-relations system under 
government-wide rules.56  AFGE held a protest rally on February 11, 2004, at the US Capitol urging Congress 
to take action to protect employee rights. 
 
In reaction, the Department decided to create a communication channel with the unions.  To facilitate dealing 
with the unions, on February 12, 2004, Secretary Rumsfeld appointed then-Secretary of the Navy, Gordon 
England, as the official Department interface with unions concerning the development and implementation of 
NSPS.57  England was appointed to this position for two reasons: 1) he was committed to NSPS and had 
pledged units of the Navy to be in the first wave of implementation; and, 2) his experience with unions as an 
executive with General Dynamics Corporation.58 Sharon Seymour, former Air Force Associate Director 
Personnel Policy for NSPS, said OSD made little effort to get the unions onboard: “we just tried to jam it 
through before [the unions] noticed. And that just made it worse.”59 
 
Over the course of two days, February 26 and 27, 2004, DoD and OPM met with union leaders in a meeting of 
more than 100 people, moderated by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS),60 to discuss the 
pre-decisional labor relations proposal. From meeting minutes published on both the AFGE and the Fraternal 
Order of Police websites, it is clear that the unions were frustrated by their role in the process of developing 
NSPS labor relations regulations. They also indicated that the Department was circumventing existing labor 
laws and defying NSPS enactment legislation and Congressional intent.61 According to AFGE, the Department 
immediately put OPM and union representatives in the role of subordinates by calling the meeting a “DoD 
meeting,” and by stating that the meeting was not statutorily required but rather that the Department 
“extended the invitation to the unions to gain their input to the proposal.”62 Although DoD claimed to want 
input, it emphasized that they did not want the consultation meeting to turn into formal negotiations.63  Union 
leaders, however, wanted to treat the consultation like collective bargaining, but the Department insisted that 
the meeting was for collaboration, as required in the authorization act,  not bargaining.64  Union leaders 
criticized the Department’s apparent unilateral development of NSPS and claimed the Department’s actions 
were contrary to a letter sent to a number of union leaders by Secretary Rumsfeld immediately after 9/11 in 
which he stated that he looked forward to their future input and collaboration on how to reform the civil 
service to improve national security.65 
 
                                                                    
53 Shawn Zeller 
54 John Gage quoted in: Christopher Lee, “Employees to Protest Pentagon Labor Plan,” Washington Post, (February 10, 2004). 
55 John Gage quoted in: Shawn Zeller  
56 Shawn Zeller 
57 Stephen Barr, “Pentagon Puts New Face on Overhaul of Personnel System,” Washington Post, (February 13, 2004). 
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There were many issues raised by the unions in the first day of the meeting that they saw as infringing upon 
employees’ rights.  One was the Department’s intention to redefine much of the terminology and processes 
used in labor law including collective bargaining, consultation, and the adversarial process.66  According to 
AFGE, the Department claimed that “we are redefining the terms and how the process will work.”67  Although 
the Department argued that the changes were created with national security and management needs in mind, 
AFGE asserted that the Department was unwilling to explain how any provision was related to national 
security: whenever asked, the Department would allegedly explain with a phrase similar to “we are only here 
to address the concepts” and “we are not going to enter into debate on why we believe this impacts national 
security.”68 Union representatives were frustrated by the Department’s refusal to explain how each condition 
pertained to national security, or, conversely, how collective bargaining had ever hindered national security. 
According to AFGE, when they demanded proof of such a hindrance, DoD failed to answer them. 69 
 
The second day’s discussions centered on the proposed Defense Labor Relations Board (DLRB).70  Under the 
existing system, Federal sector labor disputes are primarily adjudicated by the Federal Labor Relations 
Authority (FLRA)—an “independent administrative agency that was created by Title VII of the CSRA.”71 The 
proposed DLRB would be an independent review board operated within DoD to adjudicate DoD employee 
grievances, and members of the DLRB would be appointed by the Secretary. The unions, however, were 
concerned about the independence of the proposed DLRB.72  They additionally claimed that Senator George V. 
Voinovich (R-OH) and other senators had also expressed concern over the proposed DLRB, and unions 
demanded to know what role OPM played in the development of the DLRB.73 According to meeting notes from 
the Fraternal Order of Police, whose representatives were present at the meeting, the Department said “we 
are here to talk about concepts, not whether [DLRB] is legal or not.”74   
 
It was at this point in the discussions that the Department admitted it had drafted the proposal without any 
input by OPM. According to AFGE, OPM said that it had just gotten involved and that it could really only speak 
to the DHS personnel system because it had no role in the development of NSPS before the week of the 
meeting.75  To subsequent questions directed at OPM, the AFGE minutes claim that “DoD is not allowing OPM 
to respond.”76  The unions then urged OPM to take a more active role in the process and to defend employee 
rights.   
 
The conclusion of the two-day meeting did not end amicably.  The unions asserted the letter inviting them to 
the meeting was disingenuous: “[the letter] states that you will take our input and consider [it] but we are 
hearing that this is a done deal—you cannot eliminate employee rights while simplifying the system.”77 The 
unions indicated that they were being addressed as though they were children.78  Bunn noted the tension at 
the meetings: “the unions […] by the second day were downright hostile and inflammatory.”79 One illustration 
                                                                    
66 Enid Doggett, AFGE, “DoD’s Conceptual Destruction of Collective Bargaining: Background Analysis of 2/6/04 DoD Paper ‘NSPS Pre-
Collaboration Labor Relations Systems Options,’” (February 2004). 
67 AFGE, 8. 
68 AFGE, 7. 
69 AFGE, 10. 
70 Before NSPS LR regulations were written, the proposed board was called the DLRB, but when the NSPS LR regulations were published 
the name was changed to the National Security Labor Relations Board (NSLRB). 
71 US Federal Relations Authority, “Federal Labor Relations Authority homepage,” accessible at http://www.flra.gov/index.html 
(accessed July 22, 2009). 
72 AFGE, 12. 
73 AFGE 
74 Fraternal Order of Police, “Notes from DoD/Union Meeting 2/26-2/27/2004,” (February 2004). 
75 AFGE, 13. 
76 AFGE 
77 AFGE, 19. 
78 AFGE 
79 Bunn interview 
Phase One: A False Start  
©2009    Center for Defense Management Research       
             11 
of this hostility appears in the AFGE minutes.  At the close of the meeting on the second day, a representative 
of “DEFCON80 Steering Group” of AFGE said:  
 
“I have sat here for the last two days listening to your bullshit.  I represent over 600,000 DoD 
employees.  We are not going to be part of this dog and pony show anymore.  We will leave our 
labor relations and attorneys here to finish this.”81  
 
Union leadership was careful to make Congress aware of the meetings with DoD.  Before the meeting 
concluded, union leaders issued a letter to “All Members of Congress” outlining their concerns with the 
Department’s proposal. In turn, a series of three letters were sent to DoD from members of both houses of 
Congress expressing concern with NSPS.  One letter from Congress was sent the day before the scheduled 
meeting between unions and DoD, and the other two were sent after the meeting. (See Appendix E). 
The role of OPM in the initial strategy 
Although the outlined strategy and the FY2004 NDAA stated that DoD and OPM would collaboratively design 
and implement NSPS, the OPM role during this period was not well understood and DoD moved forward on 
its own in designing and implementing NSPS.  There was no OPM input in the earliest NSPS design and 
implementation time period, nor at the first formal discussion with DoD employee representatives on January 
22. OPM was not approached for input until the February 26-27 meeting, three months after the November 
24, 2003 enactment.82  In a February 6, 2004, conference call with reporters to discuss the OPM budget 
request, OPM Associate Director Clarence Crawford acknowledged that OPM and DoD were not partners in 
the development of NSPS when he said, “we’re now just beginning to have some conversations with the 
Department of Defense.  I don’t believe we’ve quite figured out what the level and nature of the support will 
be.”83  Dr. Ronald P. Sanders, OPM Associate Director for Strategic Human Resources Policy at the time, puts it 
more bluntly: “OPM was largely locked out of the room [...] OPM, from the Director on down, was concerned 
that this was moving down a path that we weren’t comfortable with and, more importantly, [a path that] we 
didn’t think comported with the law.”84  As for the DoD’s view, Bunn explained OPM’s role this way:  
 
“When there were discussions at the OMB level, it was clear that, yes, OPM is your partner, but 
DOD, you’re going to be driving this train.  That thinking facilitated our approach to how we did 
this, so at the time, in my role, I didn’t feel it necessary to run everything by OPM.  Ms. Groeber 
didn’t feel it was necessary to run everything by OPM.  That was the way it was working.  
Clearly OPM had different thoughts about that.”85 
 
Despite statutory requirements to the contrary, the Department appeared to be designing NSPS on its own 
without any input from OPM. 
 
Evidence that the Department was not involving OPM can be found in a March 9, 2004, letter (and its 41 
pages of attachments) from OPM Director Kay Coles James to Secretary Rumsfeld (See Appendix B).  OPM had 
been asked by DoD to evaluate the pay and staffing features of NSPS that DoD had developed and to respond 
by March 9. Bunn explained that OPM had aired its concerns with the implementation strategy before the 
letter but only at levels below political appointees, and that the letter was the culmination of the complaints 
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made at lower levels.86  Sanders said that Director James’ intention was to “for the record, put DoD on 
notice.”87 In the letter, James said that her staff has “no higher priority” than NSPS, and, because of that 
commitment, they were very critical of the DoD proposal. Specifically, OPM chastised DoD for ignoring the 
statutory provisions of NSPS and warned that “failure to execute [NSPS] correctly could undermine 
everything we are trying to achieve with NSPS,” to include giving congressional and union opponents 
ammunition to use against the DHS system and other agencies’ efforts to implement pay-for-performance.”88  
She stated that the proposal went against the intent expressed by Congress and the Administration by 
abolishing veteran’s preferences and by ignoring union contributions, and she further asserted that “the NSPS 
proposal undermines the Administration’s efforts to modernize the Federal civil service.”89  According to 
James, the labor-management proposal was developed “without any prior OPM involvement or union input,” 
which she said was in direct contradiction to the enacting legislation.90,91 James also expressed concern that 
the Department’s efforts to redefine collective bargaining or replace it with “consultation” could be illegal.92  
However, James seemed to be supportive of giving management more rights over employees: “we strongly 
support the objective of assuring DoD’s discretion to act without being burdened by collective bargaining 
obligations,” she said, adding that using broader enabling regulations would put DoD in a position “to issue as 
many standardized, detailed internal NSPS implementing directives as and when you see fit, including the 
[NSPS proposal] you have provided us for comment—generally without further public comment, formal 
collaboration with unions, or OPM approval.”93  
 
When he first saw the letter, Curry thought that it was, “only a matter of time before this becomes public.” 
Even though it was several months before it did actually become public, Curry noted that the unions 
responded negatively when it did: “it was, from the union’s perspective, a road map for us to avoid collective 
bargaining.”94  In earlier meetings, the unions had seen OPM as an advocate for labor rights; however, after 
seeing this letter, OPM was then seen by the unions as participant in the Bush Administration’s perceived 
quest to bust unions.95 According to an AFGE publication: “The letter and attachments provided the Secretary 
a blueprint on evading both collective bargaining and the full scope of the ‘meet and confer’ obligation in 
NSPS.”96 
 
Director James concluded her letter by encouraging the Department to reconsider its current strategy for 
implementing NSPS; specifically, she called for them to include OPM as an equal partner in any future 
implementation strategy and to establish a mechanism to receive and incorporate any employee input.  
Sanders explained that OPM was especially concerned that DoD was only focused on the pay-for-performance 
aspect of NSPS and was not using the legislation’s authority to its maximum potential: “we really wanted to 
look at labor markets and match jobs and take full advantage of the tremendous flexibility that the NSPS 
statues gave us.”97 This letter is early evidence of discord within the Administration on NSPS implementation. 
In this direct message to the Department—and to Secretary Rumsfeld in particular—OPM asserted that DoD 
needed to change its strategy if it wanted NSPS to be a successful program.  In addition to the criticism, 
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however, James was also pledging to devote her resources to implementation and urging the Department to 
accept her help. 
Phase one wrap up 
A defining characteristic of the Department’s initial strategy was its unilateral approach.  In an interview, 
Seymour faulted the Department leadership’s effort to try to “jam through” the implementation of NSPS 
without consulting anyone outside of the senior leadership as a major contributing factor to the failure of the 
initial implementation strategy.98  Bunn also acknowledged the challenges: “there was clearly a disconnect 
between the expectations of DoD, OPM, and those of the union attendees.”99 
 
On March 11, 2004, OPM and DoD had a meeting to discuss the concerns raised in Director James’ letter.  The 
following day Secretary Rumsfeld directed the establishment of a strategic and comprehensive review of 
NSPS development.  
Phase Two: Strategic Pause (March 12 – April 27, 2004) 
On March 12, 2004—the day after DoD leaders met with OPM Director James—Secretary Rumsfeld directed 
the Department to freeze NSPS and to review the design and implementation plan.  It is important to note that 
while this period is characterized as the strategic pause phase, there was also a period of “strategic 
engagement” that happened within this phase.  Specifically, the “strategic pause” refers to Secretary Rumsfeld 
directing the official cessation of the initial implementation strategy; no action was to be taken to further 
develop NSPS under the old strategy.100  The “strategic engagement” refers to a series of meetings that took 
place, during the pause, between senior leaders at the level of assistant secretary and above, “with some 
heavy hitters brought in from their staffs and organizations from DoD that weren’t necessarily personnel 
types or manpower/readiness types.”101  Nonetheless, the strategic engagement period illustrates that the 
term “pause” is potentially misleading—there was still much activity happening during this phase. While the 
original strategy was put on hold, the Department did not stop working on NSPS.  As Seymour put it, “they 
[DoD] continued moving, they just didn’t move towards implementation directly.”102 Many of the people 
interviewed indicated that this phase was, ironically, the most hectic and important time of NSPS 
development; it was during the strategic pause that DoD set up the foundations for eventual NSPS 
implementation.103 Bunn described the pause as “something new every day and lots to do because even 
though there was this pause, there was still a recognition that we had to get moving, that we needed to 
maintain the momentum that we needed to get it back on track.”104  
Why pause? 
 
A number of external and internal factors made Department leadership conclude that a strategic pause was 
necessary.  The concerns with the initial strategy were primarily focused on key issues such as employee 
involvement, OPM collaboration, the aggressive and rigid timetable, and internal and external 
communication.  Many in DoD, who would be involved in implementing NSPS but were below the leadership 
level, indicated they were not being included in the design and implementation process even though they 
would be responsible to roll out the system.105 In addition, the service components felt left out. Sanders 
explained that while OPM, OMB, and the unions were causing external pressure from outside the Department, 
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the services were also frustrated: “military services were just as vocal inside the Department: they had not 
been engaged or consulted.”106   
 
Congress also had begun to urge the Department to reconsider its strategy for implementing NSPS.  Letters 
from several congressional leaders to Secretary Rumsfeld urged him to review the implementation strategy 
and charged him with not following Congress’ intent (see Appendix E).  For example, on the same day of the 
decision to freeze NSPS—March 12, 2004—US Senator Daniel K. Akaka (D-Hawaii), Ranking Member of the 
Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security 
(FMBIS), sent a letter to Secretary Rumsfeld urging that the Department publish any and all personnel 
proposals jointly with OPM in the Federal Register rather than unilaterally issuing them as internal 
regulations.107  Senator Akaka said, “the devil is in the details, the best intentions may be overcome by 
wrongheaded implementation,” adding that the Department should rethink its implementation strategy.108 
OPM’s role  
Whereas OPM hadn’t been involved in the first phase, the Department did include them during the strategic 
pause.  In response to the various sources of pressure, the Department needed to make OPM a true partner 
and not fall back on, as Sanders put it, the argument of “in the interest of national security, I win.”109 DoD had 
been criticized both by Congress and unions as ignoring OPM, whose role was to protect government-wide 
interests. Leaving OPM out of the process, critics charged, was contrary to Congressional intent. 110 So, one of 
the key actions necessary during the strategic pause was “that the DoD was going to more actively engage 
OPM.”111  James named former congressional staffer George Nesterczuk  as Senior Advisor for Department of 
Defense matters, and she offered his services to DoD and granted him full access to OPM resources.  
According to Sanders, James offered Nesterczuk to DoD on the basis that, “’Here, this is our person. He speaks 
for me. He's there for you.’”112 
 
Perhaps the largest issue to be addressed between OPM and DoD was how to release the new Human 
Resources (NSPS HR) and Labor Relations (NSPS LR) regulations.  The Department believed that reforming 
its personnel system was an internal process, and they wanted to release any regulations as internal 
departmental policies.  OPM urged publication of any regulations in the Federal Register to protect NSPS 
against potential litigation on the issue of transparency. Bunn described this debate by saying, “we can do it 
quickly and recognize that NSPS is a DoD system, or we could do it via the Federal Register process, which 
might give us a bit more protection if the regulations were challenged.”113 The Department and OPM jointly 
concluded that, in the interest of addressing some of the concerns raised by Congress and union leadership, 
all regulations would be published in the Federal Register for public review and comment.  Bunn said that the 
decision to publish the regulations was probably the most significant decision made during the strategic 
pause because it made the final regulations transparent and thus ended the unilateral approach that the 
Department had previously followed.114 
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Structure of pause 
A total review of NSPS design and implementation was conducted through five work groups, each consisting 
of twenty-four to thirty people with expertise in the topic and representing OPM and DoD entities.115   Each of 
the work groups was assigned a specific core element of NSPS to review, evaluate, and recommend how to 
make improvements.116  Later work groups addressed specific NSPS regulations.  Bunn served on a number of 
the work groups and described them as involving a “series of all-day meetings with specific deliverables.” He 
said that the work groups addressed one broad question: “Is the whole effort going to stay within the Under 
Secretary of Personnel and Readiness […] or is it going to be put under something different like Secretary of 
Navy?”117  
 
In an April 1, 2004, open letter to DoD civilian employees from Chu and England, the Department outlined its 
objectives in the strategic pause phase. Importantly, at the time of the letter it was undecided who would 
govern the implementation of NSPS—the Undersecretary (P&R) or the Department of the Navy. As a result, 
the letter was issued without official letterhead but signed by both Chu and England.  The letter tried to ease 
tensions with civilian personnel by saying that the Department was committed to taking whatever time was 
necessary to implement NSPS correctly.  The Secretaries also addressed the concerns of transparency: “[we] 
want to ensure that all stakeholders in the new system—including civilian employees, managers, and 
exclusive representatives—have an opportunity to provide their thoughts, ideas and concerns.”118  The letter 
emphasized that the Department’s national security mission was its primary objective, but that it also sought 
to treat employees fairly and to protect their rights.119 
Findings of work groups and the new strategy 
The recommendations made by the work groups changed the course of NSPS.  The work groups concluded 
that the Department should abandon Best Practices as its model, start the NSPS design from scratch, and 
design and implement the program under a new organization. This proposal created some interoffice stress 
because Chu’s office had developed Best Practices and had been responsible for implementing NSPS under 
the initial strategy.  As Chu explained, “there were some hurt feeling in my office about this change because 
we had earlier been in the lead.”120 Nonetheless, Chu and many of his subordinates continued to play roles in 
the development of NSPS.  On April 13, 2004, the NSPS implementation recommendations were presented to 
the DoD Senior Leader Review Group (SLRG) and approved by Secretary Rumsfeld.    
 
The new strategy adopted a familiar model of program implementation that was widely understood and 
accepted across the Department.  The new model established the Program Executive Office (PEO) to be 
responsible for designing and implementing NSPS and outlined a new governance structure that allowed both 
the Department and OPM to serve as overseers of the implementation process.  Pete Brown, who was 
eventually selected as interim Program Executive Officer (PEO), emphasized the importance of adopting the 
new model because the “whole DoD structure recognizes [it] as an entity put in place to deploy something.”121
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Unions 
The unions also used the strategic pause to regroup and rethink their NSPS strategy.  At the earlier February 
meetings with DoD, each union leader represented an individual union’s position and there was no solidarity 
among them.  With no sense of unity, the unions could only react to what was presented by DoD without a 
common objective or strategy.  The result was unexpected and unusual: the Department’s approach to 
dealing with the unions had an effect that Curry said he thought could never happen: “we united unions.”122 
During the strategic pause phase, a majority of the unions joined forces and formed the United Defense 
Workers Coalition (UDWC).  Although there were many internal disagreements about how the unions should 
handle DoD and OPM, the UDWC had a unified purpose of revising or repealing NSPS.  To maintain its 
uniformity, the Coalition adopted many of the AFL-CIO internal rules including the provision that, under 
penalty of expulsion from the Coalition, no union shall independently confer with management or raid other 
bargaining units. 123   
 
The Coalition quickly began its fight against NSPS. Even though the Department did not meet with the unions 
until after the strategic pause had concluded and the PEO was fully in place, the Coalition immediately began 
lobbying Congress to revise or repeal NSPS.124  As Bunn put it, “the unions were knocking on doors in 
Congress expressing their concern rather vigorously that NSPS was off the rails, was terrible and a bad idea, 
and the way we were running it was bad.”125  
 
Phase Three: NSPS Implementation under the Program Executive 
Office (April 28, 2004 – January 16, 2009) 
Design of NSPS under PEO 
During this phase of NSPS implementation, a new governance structure was created under the PEO and NSPS 
HR was finalized. The final design of NSPS was also completed.  The two core elements of NSPS first 
introduced by the Best Practices model—pay-for-performance and pay banding—remained the cornerstones 
of NSPS, but they were slightly modified in the final phase.   
 
A change in pay banding came largely from input from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The 
Department invited input from OMB in the design of NSPS in the summer of 2004.  Including OMB ensured 
that the Administration was on board and supportive of NSPS.  In response to an OMB critique, the pay 
banding system was modified so that there were four career groups: Standard Career Group (most white 
collar workers: by far the largest group represented in DoD); Investigative and Protective Services Career 
Group; Medical Career Group; and Scientific and Engineering Group.  Figure 1 is a diagram from the online 
training course “NSPS 101” and shows the proportion of the 205,000 NSPS employees categorized as each of 
the career groups. 126 The PEO finalized the structure of the pay bands, and outlined the structure in “NSPS 
101.” Each of the four career groups is divided into pay schedules, and each pay schedule is then divided into 
pay bands. This structure is meant to give DoD flexibility to offer varying salaries to employees based on their 
experience and qualifications rather than their seniority within the Department.  As Figure 3 shows,127 the 
pay schedules depend on what type of work an employee does within a career group.  Under each pay 
schedule, the pay bands enumerate the minimum and maximum salaries attainable within each pay schedule.   
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NSPS 101 states that the career group and pay schedule are determined by the nature of the work performed, 
career patterns, department/agency mission, and job competencies.128  This design was intended to allow 
employees to be paid based on the contribution they make to the overall mission of the department or agency 
for which they work. 
 
The design of the pay-for-performance aspect was also modified from the original design.  Originally there 
was no provision requiring employees receive the annual government-wide pay increase authorized by 
Congress.  In fact, it would be possible for an employee to receive less than the standard increase.  After later 
congressional action, the regulation was modified so NSPS employees would receive a guaranteed 60% of the 
general increase, and 40% of their annual salary adjustment would be based strictly on job performance. 
Also, NSPS employees were not guaranteed the local market supplement increase that was utilized under GS 
to compensate employees who live in regions with higher cost of living.  However, DoD had authority to 
create targeted local market supplements in response to relevant factors and it retained this authority. And, 
as a matter of policy, DoD did provide the local market supplement. But after congressional action, the final 
regulations ensured that, as illustrated in Figure 4,129 only employees who scored a “1” would not be eligible 
for the Local Market Supplement Increase or the general pay raise. 
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Figure 1: NSPS employees broken down by career group 
Figure 2 (left): The four career groups are broken into pay schedules determined by an employee’s type of work. 
Figure 3 (Right): Each pay schedule is broken down into pay bands that determine the maximum and minimum 
salaries for employees under each career group. 
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Structure of PEO 
At the conclusion of the “strategic pause,” Secretary England announced the formation of the PEO on April 27, 
2004. Although he would not officially be designated as the NSPS Senior Executive until May 19, Secretary 
England led the Department’s efforts to form the PEO.130  Even though the PEO charter wouldn’t be 
formalized until later, England announced the structure as part of the way forward after the strategic pause.  
The governance structure designed for PEO-NSPS is shown in Figure 5. 131  The Director of OPM and the 
Secretary of Defense are structured as equals during the “jointly prescribed” design phase.”  To further show 
collaboration between the agencies, OPM had permanent staff people at the PEO office who served as 
representatives of the Director.  Sanders explained that OPM was much more involved now: “[OPM] went 
from locked outside the doors to intimate involvement and essentially co-drafting the regulations.”132  Before 
all subsequent meetings with unions, DoD and OPM met ahead of time to coordinate, and the meetings would 
be co-led by both agencies.  The PEO was chartered to “establish a central, DoD-wide office to design, develop, 
                                                                    
130 Gordon England was a major force behind NSPS implementation, and remained involved with NSPS through his tenure in the Bush 
Administration: Secretary of the Navy (May 24, 2001-January 24, 2003/October 1, 2003-January 3, 2006); Deputy Secretary of Homeland 
Security (January 24, 2003-October 1, 2003); Deputy Secretary of Defense (January 4, 2006-February 1, 2009). 
131 Figure 5 from: US Army, “Annex A NSPS Program and Management and Governance Structure,” (Sept 30, 2005) accessible at 
http://www.cpol.army.mil/library/general/nsps/docs/campaign-plan-annexes.pdf, (accessed July 17,2009). 
132 Sanders interview 
Figure 4: Definitions of the five-point employee 
performance scores. 
Figure 5: PEO-NSPS Governance Structure.  
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and implement NSPS,”133 and to lead the components and all design/implementation offices for designing and 
implementing NSPS. 
The Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT)—formally chartered on May 27, 2004—was a key part of 
the PEO strategy. Essentially, the OIPT was meant to serve as an executive body to the PEO with which the 
PEO could consult before or in lieu of consulting the senior executive.  The OIPT was “a forum for quickly 
raising and resolving choices that we had to confront in terms of design, reaching interagency agreement on 
what the design features would be, or if we couldn’t agree there, rapidly escalating to the NSPS senior 
executive.”134 The OIPT made many of the important decisions throughout the implementation process, 
including those about the organizational/agency members of each phase of implementation and the dates the 
spirals would be converted to NSPS. 
Interim PEO 
Many of the policies and standard operating procedures used by the PEO were established by the Interim 
PEO, Pete Brown. Brown was the Executive Director at Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA).  He had been 
involved with the work groups during the strategic pause and was familiar with the PEO structure of 
governance.  Brown’s role was to set up the working groups that would design the system under the PEO. 
Secretary England described the work groups as “working with us, providing assistance and expertise, in 
developing regulations, which are to be signed by the Defense Secretary and the Director of OPM.”135 
Eventually, the work groups would produce recommended regulations for the Department and OPM to 
consider adopting.  Brown also set up the entire NSPS-PEO infrastructure so that the first PEO could come 
onto the job and start immediately: “I set things up but I didn’t pull the triggers. Best kind of job to have.”136  
Brown stressed that he wanted to set up the PEO without leaving his mark on the organization: “I did not 
want to put my fingerprint on anything when I know somebody else was coming behind me, even when I 
didn’t know who it was.”137   He also wanted the PEO to have the flexibility to evolve and not be confined to 
his design: “you don’t want the organization to be branded to you, so it’s got to learn to brand itself.”138  
During the set-up phase, OSD was very concerned that the project be implemented correctly. Brown noted 
that OSD wanted to be highly involved: “they [PEO-NSPS] couldn’t even figure out how to get help to set up a 
website without the central DoD public affairs crowd wanting to look over their shoulders.”139  Brown also 
said that “you had to kiss the ring”—that is, pay tribute to certain key central DoD people—because a few 
people would derail the project if they were not included.140  Bunn gave Brown a significant amount of credit 
for the PEO’s successes, noting that Brown had the perfect strategy to implement the PEO.141 
PEO-NSPS implementation strategy 
One important part of the new PEO implementation strategy was communication with employees and 
interest groups.  The cornerstone of this new communication strategy was the development and release of 
the new NSPS website, which was launched on June 8, 2004.  The website was used as a forum for discussion 
on all future proposals and regulations issued by the PEO. It served as a location where employees could take 
online training on NSPS, where news and updates would be released to the public, and where employees 
could access the steps to complete the assessment reports and other necessary documents once they were 
under NSPS.142 The other form of communication adopted by the PEO was the use of town hall meetings to 
                                                                    
133 Patricia Bradshaw (Deputy Under Secretary of Defense CPP), “Beyond the PEO: Transitioning NSPS from Design and Deployment to 
Long Term Sustainment,” NSPS Leader Workshop, (June 6, 2007), accessible online at    
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gain input and feedback from employees during the design phase, and to answer any questions and allay any 
fears during the implementation phase.  The first town hall meeting was conducted by Secretary England at 
the Pentagon on July 7, 2004, to introduce the system and process to employees. Over the next several years 
hundreds of town hall meetings were held across the country.143  Feedback to the PEO indicated that 
employees appreciated the outreach because it made the new system much less foreign.144 
 
Working groups were created to gain a cross-component collaborative effort in designing NSPS.  During the 
initial implementation effort, service components indicated that NSPS was being imposed on them from 
above and that they had no direct influence on the system’s design.  The PEO hoped to alleviate the 
impression of an imposed system by including personnel from each service component at every level of the 
Department through working groups.  Nonetheless, even though the new strategy was more inclusive, not all 
service components were entirely enthusiastic about the transition.145 
 
Like the initial strategy, the PEO implementation strategy was to roll out NSPS in phases, or “spirals.”  Each 
spiral would include a specified number of employees to be converted from GS to NSPS.  The strategy called 
for three spirals to be rolled out in succession.  In the period following each spiral, NSPS could be modified to 
address any problems that may have occurred during the previous spiral.146  The quality of the decisions 
about which employees would fall into what spiral was highly dependent on both the supervisor’s individual 
commitment to NSPS and the organization’s readiness as a whole.  Michael Dominguez said that the 
“dominant consideration in the selection of NSPS was organizational readiness and organizational leadership. 
So, Spiral 1.1 was a handpicked group of people because they had leaders who were passionate about the 
change.”147 Although Dominguez suggests that the leaders in Spiral 1.1 were enthusiastic to convert their 
units, Seymour confessed that “we twisted some arms to get some organizations to be in the first wave.”148   
 
The switch to NSPS was a dramatic cultural change for DoD.  Before NSPS, DoD operated within a culture 
where longevity and seniority were valued more than experience or performance. Under NSPS, the new 
culture was performance-based, and DoD realized that it had to assure its employees that the culture change 
was a good thing; many believed that the best way to do that was through training.  Dominguez stressed that 
there needed to be “lots and lots of training about how the system would work and how it would affect 
[employees].”149 The PEO developed online training that anyone could access to become acquainted with the 
new system.  The online training course, “NSPS 101,” introduced all of the characteristics and processes of 
NSPS and explained the Department’s goals for having a more flexible and accountable workforce.  The PEO 
also developed tools for local NSPS officials to train employees months before transition to NSPS so that, by 
the time of conversion, the employees would be reasonably comfortable with the concept of a new personnel 
system. 
  
The new PEO 
Mary Lacey was selected by Secretary England as the first permanent PEO on May 24, 2004. She assumed the 
PEO responsibilities on June 8.  Lacey had worked in DoD for more than 30 years, first in the Navy laboratory 
system and then as technical director at the Naval Surface Warfare Center.150  Pete Brown said that Lacey was 
his first choice to succeed him because she had had experience working within DoD and with unions as a 
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147 Michael Dominguez (Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness), Interviewed by Randy Richardson (Air Force Staff 
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manager of a very large workforce, and because she was comfortable with the Department’s way of doing 
business.151  Secretary England saw Lacey’s laboratory career as “the ideal launching pad for her NSPS job 
because she also ran a pilot pay-for-performance program that covered about 26,000 employees.”152 Lacey 
herself said that her engineering background would give her an advantage during the designing of NSPS 
because NSPS is a very complex system and, as an engineer, she routinely designed and operated complex 
systems.153   
 
However, Sanders said that leaders at OPM felt uncomfortable when, during meetings in the summer of 2004, 
Lacey would say that the PEO was “going dark” to write the regulations.  Sanders added that this was not a 
good word choice because to the unions and OPM it sounded as though DoD was going to ignore all input.154  
Bunn explained that Lacey used the term to indicate that the PEO was going to operate internally within the 
Administration until the NSPS draft regulations were completed, at which time communication with unions 
and others would resume.155 Bunn also said that Lacey was a very skilled bureaucrat and personnelist, and 
she knew that at some point the PEO would have to sit down and actually write the regulations; it was during 
this writing phase, he explained, that the PEO would “go dark.”156  
Unions 
The Department, through the PEO, was much more inclusive towards the unions and hosted a number of 
meetings in summer and fall 2004, during the “meet and confer” stage of NSPS design.  Bunn described the 
purpose of this stage as the following: 
 
“the idea for meet and confer was to put a proposal on the table that the union comments on, 
have interchange, have dialogue about it, see where there might be common interests that we 
can come to agreement on, but ultimately finalize a design or a set of rules that we thought was 
best for the Department”157 
 
The meetings were jointly led by Charles Abell (DoD) and George Nesterczuk (OPM).158 In stark 
contrast to the initial meetings between DoD and unions, Curry said that Abell handled the unions 
well and “had a calming effect on the unions, particularly in those early meetings, trying to show that 
we’re really trying to work with them on this stuff.”159 Sanders explained that even though unions 
were calmer in discussions with DoD and OPM, some of the exchanges were still volatile at times: “a 
couple times we exchanged words, but that’s the nature of those meetings.”160 The unions continued 
to worry that the design of the rules and regulations was really in the hands of the Secretary of 
Defense and the OPM Director.  Curry noted that the unions wanted the process to be different: “we 
started getting the sense from [the unions] that they wanted the meet and confer and collaboration 
process to look like a collective bargaining process.”161  
 
The unions had two major issues that they wanted to have resolved before the Department finalized 
the regulations.  First, union leaders insisted that the Department could not redefine collective 
bargaining.  Not only did the unions argue to keep existing bargaining rights, they also maintained 
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that those rights should be expanded.162  The second major issue was about the use of focus groups to 
get feedback from the workforce. Initially, the Department proposed that the focus groups would be a 
forum for employees to directly provide feedback to managers about  issues that might impact 
development of NSPS regulations.  However, the unions argued that “management doesn’t have the 
right to talk to its workforce” and that the Department should deal with the employees through their 
representatives, the unions.163  In response, the Department argued that it was okay to consult the 
workforce for information as long as the Department wasn’t negotiating directly with employees in 
lieu of their exclusive representative.164  The two groups were unable to come to a consensus on 
either of these points. Regardless, the Department maintained its plans for focus groups and its 
position on redefining collective bargaining.  If bargaining unit employees participated in any focus 
groups, the PEO advised the components to invite local union representatives to attend these 
sessions. 
 
The proposed NSPS HR regulations were published on February 14, 2005, for public comment and review.  
The Coalition orchestrated a well-organized campaign to submit comments through letters, email, and the 
NSPS website:  NSPS received more than 58,000 comments.165  While most of the comments were a generic 
form letter criticizing NSPS produced by the Coalition, there were many additional comments that gave light 
to the emerging problems with NSPS.  The Department had adopted the OPM suggestion raised in James’ 
letter to use broad and vague regulations, and the most common comment from employees was that there 
was not enough detail in the regulations.166  Another major issue raised in the comments was the impression 
that the Department was dismantling collective bargaining.  The unions were especially vocal in their claims 
that the regulations did not reflect any of their suggestions. Curry disagreed: “we certainly made changes, 
particularly some changes in the labor relations regulations, in response to things they’ve said.”167 
 
At this point, the Department and the unions began the statutory meet and confer process to discuss the NSPS 
regulations.  From the beginning, Curry said, the unions wanted to treat the meetings like bargaining 
meetings and opened the meeting with ground rules as though it were a negotiation.168  The Department 
reiterated that the meetings were for conferring, not for bargaining and they “weren’t going to sign away the 
Secretary’s and the Director’s authority to ultimately make the decision about what the system looks like.”169 
Federal mediators were present at all of the meetings, but by most accounts they did not play an active role, 
did not intervene directly in the meetings themselves, and preferred to mediate in the halls.170  The unions 
opened each meeting by stating that they were not going to discuss the labor relations aspect of NSPS, but 
would only discuss the human resources regulations.  Nonetheless, labor relations was a topic in the 
meetings:  “Every day we talked about labor relations, even when we talked about human resources or 
adverse actions and appeals,” Curry said.171  After meeting for almost two months, the two sides appeared to 
encounter an impasse, and several union leaders gave prepared speeches and then walked out of the meet 
and confer process.172 The Department agreed to grant the unions “one last opportunity to make their case 
about what they wanted, directly to Deputy Secretary England, the NSPS director.”173 
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The final regulations were printed in the Federal Register on November 1, 2005. The implementing issuances 
were subsequently published shortly before Thanksgiving 2005. However, the unions accused DoD of making 
it intentionally difficult to review the document. In a statement before the Defense Business Board Task 
Group on The National Security Personnel System, John Gage commented: 
 
“…shortly before Thanksgiving, in November 2005, we were deluged with 369 pages of highly 
technical Implementing Issuances, with just a 30-day period for us to comment. Clearly, DoD 
had decided on many of the details that went into these Issuances, but withheld them from us 
during the very process Congress had intended for the unions and DoD to collaborate on the 
development of NSPS.”174 
 
Indeed, the draft implementing issuances were released to unions via email after the end of business the 
Tuesday before the Thanksgiving Holiday, 2005.   The Department requested that the unions meet to discuss 
the regulations the first week of December 2005, and the unions perceived the timing as designed to slip the 
implementing issuances past the unions by giving only giving them 30 days in the middle of the holiday 
season to review hundreds of pages of policy.175  Curry explained that the Department wanted the 
collaboration phase to be complete by the end of December.  Despite their objections, most of the unions 
attended the meeting with the Department during the first week of December.  The Department also held 
another meeting in the middle of December at which only two Coalition unions showed up—the rest 
boycotted the meeting.  The unions insisted that because of the holiday season they needed until February to 
properly analyze the regulations.176 
 
The Department responded to the unions’ request for more time, and the two sides continued to meet from 
December 2005 to April 2006 through a process the Department created for continued collaboration. During 
this time, however, the Department decided not to support the costs associated with union participation in 
the meetings: “As a matter of policy, we weren’t going to pay travel and per diem for union attendees 
anymore.”177  The costs that the Department had accrued hosting the meetings over the years had gotten to a 
point where the Department concluded it had paid enough.178  This change in policy created a situation where 
representatives of smaller unions were unable to afford to attend the meetings, which had consequences 
within the Coalition. The Coalition continued to be a voice of all the unions, but only the large unions were 
present at the meetings.  
 
While the unions continued to express concerns for collective bargaining and questioned whether the General 
Schedule needed to be abolished, they also became increasingly concerned about the lack of independence of 
the National Security Labor Relations Board NSLRB.  The unions argued that because the Secretary had full 
discretion as to who served on the NSLRB, and because the board would operate within DoD, there was no 
way that the NSLRB could be unbiased when hearing employees’ grievances.179  The unions saw the NSLRB as 
an institutionalized means through which the DoD could ignore employee concerns in any future labor-
management relations disputes or policy changes. In short, the unions saw this board as eliminating due 
process during adjudication proceedings.  
Going to court 
On November 7, 2005, after publication of the final NSPS regulations but before the release of the 
implementing issuances, AFGE and other Coalition unions—representing more than 350,000 employees—
filed suit against the Secretary of Defense and the Director of OPM in the case known as AFGE et al v. Rumsfeld 
et al.  The case was essentially the Coalition unions vs. DoD and OPM, and it centered on the legality of the 
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regulations released by DoD on collective bargaining rights, the independence of the NSLRB, and whether due 
process was provided in the employee appeals procedures.180 The plaintiffs raised five challenges to the NSPS 
system: 1) defendants did not comply with statutory requirements that it work in collaboration with and 
ensure participation of employee representation;181 2) NSPS LR does not comply with “independent third 
party review” that is mandated by statute;182 3) “labor relations system established by the new rule violates 
Congress’ requirement that the NSPS ‘ensure that employees may organize, bargain collectively;’”183 4) 
NSLRB “established by the new rule does not satisfy Congress’ requirement that the new labor relations 
system provide for an ‘independent third party review’ to review labor relations decisions;”184 and, 5) 
“contrary to the statute, the regulations establishing an appeals process for disciplined employees fails to 
provide for ‘fair treatment’ and ‘due process’ as required by statute.”185 The defendants motioned for 
dismissal of the case for “lack of jurisdiction” and “failure to state a claim”186 
 
Because of the complexity of the statute, Judge Sullivan of the Court highly recommended that the 
Department not implement NSPS LR until the Court had time to consider and rule on congressional intent.  
The Department acquiesced to the Court’s request.  Curry explained why the Department decided to follow 
the court’s recommendation and postpone implementation of some NSPS elements: 
 
We didn't want to upset the court who was looking for us to delay, and if the judge is dropping 
hints that this would be a good idea, [and] if we said no, more than likely the judge was going 
to order an injunction anyway. So we agreed to do that voluntarily. It just didn't serve our 
interests to antagonize the court, and certainly didn't serve our interests to go ahead and 
implement a system that we weren't sure how the court would eventually rule on, anyway. 
 
The case was heard by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on January 24, 2006, and 
the ruling was handed down on February 27.  The District Court ruled in favor of the unions and ordered that 
NSPS LR and employee appeals procedures implementation be frozen.  The Court ruling had five parts: 
 
1) defendants satisfied their statutory obligation to collaborate with plaintiffs; 2) defendants 
lawfully departed from chapter 71 in establishing a labor relations system; 3) the new rule fails 
to ensure that employees can bargain collectively; 4) the NSLRB does not meet Congress’ 
requirement for ‘independent third party review’ of labor relations decisions; and 5) the 
process for appealing adverse actions fails to provide employees with ‘fair treatment’ as 
required by statute. 
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The Court then ordered that NSPS LR be frozen and no further action be taken to implement the labor 
relations element of the system unless the Defendants could present a proposal that conformed to 
congressional intent and ensured collective bargaining.  Figure 6 shows which elements were enjoined by the 
Court, and which elements of NSPS were underway.187  John Gage considered the Court’s ruling a major 
victory for unions, and said, “I think the judge very clearly showed in his decision that this was not collective 
bargaining by anyone’s definition,” and AFGE General Counsel, Joseph Goldberg, said that the ruling 
“eviscerates the core of NSPS, leaving but a hollow shell of provisions that simply cannot stand on their 
own.”188 Several Democratic congressional leaders made statements praising the Court’s decision.  Saying the 
decision was “great news for American workers,” Congressman Tom Allen (D-ME) stated: “It is the second 
time a federal court has determined that the Bush Administration overstepped its authority by attempting to 
deny Defense and Homeland Security Department employees the same collective bargaining rights 
guaranteed to all federal employees.”189  Mary Lacey said that the Court’s ruling would not stop the 
Department from rolling out Spiral 1.1 and converting 11,000 GS employees to NSPS because the rollout 
involved non-bargaining unit employees who would not partake in collective bargaining, adding, “I believe 
we’re right, and we are going to proceed.”190  The Department decided to proceed with the rollout of NSPS for 
all non-bargaining unit civilian employees while the case was being appealed. After the Department declared 
that it intended to appeal the previous decision, union officials—representing 200,000 employees—issued a 
vote of no-confidence and urged Secretary Rumsfeld to step down, the first time that federal workers called 
for a defense secretary to resign.191   
 
The Department appealed the Court’s decision to the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and the 
Court overturned the District Court’s ruling allowing the Department to resume NSPS LR and employee 
appeals procedures implementation.  The decision on appeal was handed down on May 18, 2007. The Court 
ruled 2-1 to overturn the District Court’s ruling and reinstate NSPS. Circuit Judge Kavanaugh presented the 
opinion of the Court saying that the primary legal question before the Court was whether FY2004 NDAA 
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“authorizes DoD to curtail collective bargaining rights that DoD’s civilian employees otherwise possess under 
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.”192   
 
The Court recognized the law as a “statutory puzzle,”193 but concluded because there was a sunset provision 
imposed on NSPS, it was clear that Congress intended to grant temporary authority to DoD to curtail 
collective bargaining rights, but that after November, 2009, either those rights must be reinstated or the 
sunset extended.194  The unions had argued that the NSPS case was identical to the court’s decision in 
Chertoff195 where it was decided that the DHS HR program illegally curtailed bargaining rights; however, the 
court ruled that the two cases were not identical because DHS did not have a sunset provision, and it was this 
distinction that showed congressional intent for authority to curtail bargaining rights to be temporary in 
DoD.196  
 
The unions pledged to continue the court battle until they had exhausted all possible avenues.  John Gage 
lamented that the Court’s decision “opens the door for everything – all aspects of NSPS,” but, he pledged, 
“we’re never going to stop fighting this thing.”197  The unions filed a petition for the case to be reheard en banc 
—heard by the entire Appeals Court—but the motion was denied on August 10, 2007.  In January, 2008, AFGE 
filed a writ of certiorari to have their case heard by the US Supreme Court, but the Court refused to hear the 
case.198  The unions tried to appeal the denial, but were once again denied.  On September 17, 2007, the Court 
of Appeals lifted the injunctions against NSPS LR. On the same day, DoD announced it was moving ahead with 
NSPS HR implementation, but—for the time being—it was only going to apply to non-bargaining unit 
employees.  
Taking the battle to Congress 
Many Democratic congressional leaders opposed the NSPS legislation in 2003 and became vocal advocates for 
union rights preceding the 2006 midterm elections.  These midterm elections transferred power in Congress 
as Democrats gained control in both the House of Representatives and Senate.  Candidates and policies 
associated with the unpopular Bush Administration were targeted throughout the campaign season—NSPS 
became a rallying point for Democrats to accuse Republicans and the Bush Administration of conspiring to 
abolish union rights.  In response to the February 2006 court ruling, Rep. Tom Allen stated, “I have opposed 
these rules since the Administration first proposed them and the Congressional majority adopted them, and 
will continue to work with my colleagues to fight this assault on the rights of federal employees.”199  After the 
Democratic victories, the unions turned their efforts to lobbying Congress.   
 
The new Congress began congressional oversight of NSPS.  In March, 2007, the House Armed Services 
Readiness Subcommittee started a series of committee hearings on the progress of NSPS implementation.200  
The Chairman of the Subcommittee, Solomon P. Ortiz (D-TX), argued that timely oversight was necessary—
even though only a fraction of the GS employees had been converted to NSPS—because of the large number of 
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DoD civilian personnel to be converted and the importance of DoD within the Federal Government.201 The 
comments of Chairman Ortiz suggested his alliance with the union position:  “Our unions are an important 
partner in managing the workforce so [we] must understand their views on the system, and listen to their 
voices […] we heard a great deal from the employee representatives themselves who found many problems, 
leading them to file a lawsuit.”202 At one of the March 2007 hearings, John Gage, AFGE National President, 
urged Congress to “repeal the statutory authority for NSPS as provided under the 2004 Defense Authorization 
Act.”203  Gage made the same arguments presented during the court cases: the NSLRB is not an independent 
board, DoD ignores union input, and the Administration is attempting to bust the unions.  The oversight 
committee stated that the court rulings indicated an impasse between unions and DoD, and that Congress was 
the place “to find common ground” by modifying the statute.204  In an effort to resolve the dispute, the 
committee produced draft legislation in the FY 2008 Defense Authorization Bill that “would restore employee 
collective bargaining rights and access to an appeals process.”205 
 
The day before the May 18, 2007, court ruling, the House passed its FY2008 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 
1585), which included language that would remove most NSPS flexibilities and completely revoke the adverse 
actions, appeals and labor relations portions of NSPS.206  OMB issued the Administration’s opposition to the 
bill, claiming that the bill would “eviscerate our effort to make civilians equal partners in a Department at 
war.”207 Immediately following the May 18 court decision, the unions sent out press releases urging that the 
“Senate must take immediate action” to stop NSPS and save employees’ rights and pass a bill similar to the 
House’s version of the Authorization Act.208  AFGE also devoted its May 25, 2007, Inside Government radio 
broadcast to discussing the next step in the congressional fight against NSPS.209  On the radio broadcast, 
Senator Patty Murray (D-WA) discussed her distrust for the Bush Administration’s motives for removing 
collective bargaining rights, and she emphasized that she would lobby her colleagues to pass a version of 
FY2008 NDAA similar to that passed by the House.210 In December 2007, the President vetoed the FY 2008 
NDAA on grounds independent of NSPS.211   
 
The final version of the FY2008 NDAA that was signed into law on January 28, 2008, dramatically reduced the 
scope of civil service reform under NSPS and made significant changes to the system.  The Act essentially 
eliminated NSPS LR by imposing the use of “government-wide rules for several portions of NSPS regulations 
that have never been implemented,” and voiding provisions for adverse actions (Subpart G), appeals (subpart 
                                                                    
201 “Oversight Begins for Civil Service System,” States News Service, (March 3, 2007), accessed online through LexisNexis, (accessed (July 
1, 2009). 
202 “Oversight Begins for Civil Service System,” States News Service, (March 3, 2007), accessed online through LexisNexis, (accessed (July 
1, 2009). 
203 House Armed Services Committee: Subcommittee on Readiness, “Rep Solomon P. Ortiz Holds A Hearing on the National Security 
Personnel System,” CQ Transcripts, accessed through LexisNexis, (accessed July 1, 2009). 
204 Subcommittee on Readiness, House Armed Services Committee (Chair Solomon P. Ortiz), “Hearing on National Security Personnel 
System,”  (March 6, 2007)CQ Transcriptions, accessed online through LexisNexis, (accessed July 1, 2009), 26 of 34. 
205 “Readiness Subcommittee Chairman Ortiz Issues Statement on National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008,” (May 8, 2007), US Fed 
News, accessed online through LexisNexis (accessed July 1, 2009). 
206 OMB Statement, “OMB Issues Statement of Administration Policy Regarding HR 1585 – National Defense Authorization Act for 
FY2008,” (May 16, 2007), accessed through LexisNexis (accessed July 1, 2009). 
207 OMB Statement 
208 “Senate Must Take Immediate Action on NSPS, says AFGE,” PR Newswire Public Interest Services, (May 18, 2007), accessible online 
through LexisNexis, (accessed July 1, 2009). 
209  John Gage (AFGE President), Mark Roth (AFGE General Council), Beth Moten (AFGE Legislative and Political Director) and Senator 
Patty Murray (D-WA) were the participants in the on air discussion 
210 Patty Murray, US Senator, on AFGE’s radio program Inside Government (May 25, 2007). 
211 A provision in the vetoed FY 2008 NDAA would have expanded rights for American victims of acts of terrorism to sue current and 
former state sponsors of terrorism for damages in US courts.  “Bush aired concerns that [the] little-publicized provision would freeze 
billions of dollars in Iraqi assets held in US financial institutions and ultimately devastate Iraqi reconstruction plans” by making the new 
Iraqi government liable to suits against the Saddam Hussein government. (Megan cully, “House Approves Revised FY08 Defense 
Authorization Bill,” CongressDaily, (January 17, 2008), accessible online at 
http://thegate.nationaljournal.com/2008/01/house_approves_revised_fy08_de.php, (accessed August 3, 2009). 
Phase Three: Program Executive Office  
©2009    Center for Defense Management Research       
             28 
H), and Labor-management Relations (Subpart I).  With these provisions voided, DoD was forced to continue 
operating “under the government-wide authorities governing adverse actions, appeals, and labor-
management relations,”212 and NSPS LR, adverse actions and employee appeals had to be abandoned.  The Act 
also required that NSPS follow existing government-wide rules and regulations regarding reduction-in-force 
(RIF) and workforce shaping including transfer of functions (TOF) (this voided Subpart F –workforce shaping, 
and Subchapter 1960-workforce shaping).  Chu said that the FY 2008 NDAA made the November 2009 sunset 
on NSPS LR moot because it essentially forced NSPS to conform to existing labor relations.213  NSPS was 
required by the Act to follow Title 5 employment laws “while preserving the flexibility to establish NSPS-
unique regulations in lieu of Government-wide regulations.”214   
 
The Act modified NSPS pay-for-performance by mandating that “all employees with a performance rating 
above ‘unacceptable’ receive at least 60 percent of the annual General Schedule (GS) Government-wide pay 
increase as a base salary increase,” and required that all employees who are rated above ‘unacceptable’ 
receive locality-based comparability payments “in the same manner and to the same extent as employees 
eligible for locality pay under the General Schedule.”215  Under the Act, Federal Wage System (FWS) 
employees were exempted from NSPS HR, which meant that NSPS would only apply to white-collar 
employees.  Congress, apparently responsive to the unions’ lobbying efforts, included a provision that 
eliminated the “collaboration” aspect of NSPS LR and reinstated collective bargaining rights for employee 
representatives during the implementation phases.  The Act also put a limit of 100,000 employees who could 
be converted to NSPS in any calendar year, and it required the Comptroller General to conduct an annual 
review of employee satisfaction with NSPS.  Although many changes were made to NSPS, the core elements of 
pay-for-performance and pay banding largely remained, albeit modified.  On May 22, 2008, DoD and OPM 
issued proposed joint regulations in the Federal Register modifying NSPS to conform to the new legislation.216 
 
Congressional interest in NSPS continued during this period as well, and both England and Lacey were 
regularly engaged in meetings and briefings with Members of Congress and their staffs to keep them 
informed and respond to questions. The Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the 
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia also held hearings to discuss Federal workers’ compensation 
and NSPS.  The Subcommittee met in Chairman Akaka’s (D) home state of Hawaii on May 27-30, 2008, in six 
hearings about Federal workers’ compensation.  NSPS was the topic for the May 29, 2008, hearing, and Bunn, 
who had been appointed PEO by Deputy Defense Secretary England on May 11, 2008, represented DoD in the 
subcommittee hearing. 
 
Senator Carl Levin and Rep. Ike Skelton—chairmen of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, 
respectively—sent a letter to Secretary England on September 10, 2008, requesting DoD “refrain from taking 
any action to finalize the proposed rule issued May 22, 2008 regarding the National Security Personnel 
System (NSPS) until a new Administration has an opportunity to review and make decisions with regard to 
the proposed rule.”217 The committee chairs asserted that they “strongly believe that the proposed 
regulations go beyond the intent of the revisions made to NSPS” in the FY2008 NDAA.218  In the letter, they 
opposed regulations that limited employee representatives’ rights, and they additionally argued that the 
“proposed regulations would restrict such rights by unilaterally removing negotiable issues from the scope of 
collective bargaining […] that clearly was not the intent of Congress.”219 Levin and Skelton also criticized the 
“uncertainty” that was created by the Department’s repeatedly changing the NSPS regulations—even though 
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many of the changes were largely due to congressional action—claiming that such changes are not good for 
either the Department or its employees.220  
 
In his September 19, 2008, response to the letter, Secretary England assured that DoD was “making some 
modifications to the ‘rate of pay’ definition” after the FY2008 NDAA indicated that Congress wanted such a 
definition.  He also assured them their concerns around collective bargaining were unwarranted because no 
collective bargaining units had been converted to NSPS.  England essentially declined the request to freeze 
NSPS implementation: “the Department believes the prudent course of action is to complete the rulemaking 
process, which brings the NSPS regulations into conformance with law, and stabilizes the policies under 
which over 180,000 of our employees are operating.”221   
Government reports on NSPS implementation 
A number of government reports were published at the request of Congress that reviewed and analyzed NSPS 
implementation.  In May, 2007, OPM published Creating a Foundation for the 21st Century Federal Workforce: 
An Assessment of the Implementation of the Department of Defense National Security Personnel System. In the 
report, OPM concluded the following: 
 DoD effectively planned for implementing NSPS. 
 DoD implemented NSPS in a relatively small portion of the workforce and data are 
not yet available to assess several of the progress metrics.  The data thus far indicate 
the Department is on track to meet milestones. 
 The establishment of the Program Executive Office has been central to successful 
implementation of NSPS. DoD has structured a well-organized and integrated 
phased implementation approach. 
 DoD should anticipate and plan for the risk of losing implementation momentum, 
given future senior leadership turnover222 
 
The report gave a relatively good report of NSPS progress and generally accounts for any deficiencies 
as resulting from the lack of data.  Agencies that were not as closely involved as OPM in NSPS 
implementation produced reports that were not as positive, but which nonetheless confirmed there 
was not enough evidence to reach a strong conclusion about NSPS. 
 
In July 2007, GAO released a report, Human Capital: DoD Needs Better Internal Controls and Visibility 
over Costs for Implementing Its National Security Personnel System, in which the GAO concluded that 
the Department’s initial estimate of $158 million for implementation costs through 2008 was 
underestimated, and added, “without an effective oversight mechanism to ensure that the official 
accounting systems capture all appropriate costs, DoD and Congress do not have visibility over the 
actual cost to design and implement NSPS.”223  
 
In September, 2008, the GAO released another NSPS evaluation report to Congress concluding that 
DoD needed to improve its implementation strategy and its communication to employees.  The 
report found that while “DoD has taken some steps to implement internal safeguards to ensure that 
NSPS is fair, effective, and credible, the implementation of some safeguards could be improved.”224  In 
the report, the GAO identifies eight “safeguards” that DoD “could improve”: 1) involve employees in 
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the system’s design and implementation; 2) link employee objectives and agency goals; 3) train 
employees on the system’s operation; 4) require ongoing performance feedback between 
supervisors and employees; 5) better link individual pay to performance; 6) allocate agency 
resources for the system; 7) include pre-decisional safeguards to determine if rating results are fair 
and nondiscriminatory; 8) provide reasonable transparency; and 9) provide meaningful distinctions 
in employee performance.225  The report also criticized DoD for not having “an action plan to address 
the generally negative employee perceptions of NSPS.”226  Although employees had positive 
perceptions about some parts of NSPS, the GAO found that “employees who had the most experience 
under NSPS showed a negative movement in their perceptions,” and that those employees under 
NSPS with positive perceptions of the system fell from 40 percent in 2006 to 23 percent in 2007.227 
 
On September 17, 2008, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) released a report for Congress 
that was more historical, but nonetheless concluded that because NSPS was created by statute, 
Congress should assume the responsibility to ensure that the system and implementation process 
was transparent and fair.  The report also agreed that NSPS might be used to demonstrate pay-for-
performance across the Federal Government.228 
 
In November 2008,229 the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released A Review of the Department of 
Defense’s National Security Personnel System, which they produced at the request of the Chairman of 
the Subcommittee on Readiness of the House Committee on Armed Services. The purpose of the 
report was “to examine the extent to which NSPS has achieved, or has the prospect of achieving, the 
most salient goals stated in the [FY]2004 NDAA.”230 The CBO report was similar to the CRS report in 
that it gave the history of NSPS, but it conducted a more critical analysis by comparing the stated 
NSPS goals in 2003 to its accomplishments of 2008.  The report concluded: “Given that NSPS is 
ongoing, sufficient data do not yet exist to enable the Congressional Budget Office to determine 
precisely what success NSPS has had to date in achieving its intended objectives.”231 
A New President and Published Final Regulations 
During the 2008 presidential election campaign, candidate Barack Obama responded to a letter submitted to 
him by Gregory Junemann,232 National President of the International Federation of Professional & Technical 
Engineers, which asked the candidate whether or not he supported NSPS.  In his letter, Obama agreed with 
Junemann that it was “inappropriate and unwise for DoD to implement such a highly contentious, ill-
conceived program so late in this administration, particularly following the vast revisions to the program 
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included in the FY 08 National Defense Authorization Act.”233  Obama outlined his major concerns with NSPS, 
including its restrictions of bargaining rights, a disconnection between pay and performance, the use of a 
forced distribution to determine performance ratings, the suppression of wages and benefits as a result of 
bonuses in lieu of raises, and what he termed as the “virtual elimination of merit consideration in the 
promotion process.”234  Obama said that he “cannot and will not support a pay system which discriminates 
against employees,” and he promised that if he were elected President he would “substantially revise these 
NSPS regulations, and strongly consider a complete repeal.”235  Barack Obama was elected President of the 
United States on November 4, 2008. 
 
The final portion of NSPS regulations were published in the January 16, 2009, Federal Register.  The January 
16 regulations built on the regulations published in the September 26, 2008 Federal Register by adding 
Subpart E, “staffing and employment” to NSPS.236 With all of the regulations published, NSPS was set up for 
the Department to complete rolling out the new system.  Nevertheless, its long-term future remained 
uncertain because four days after the regulations were published, President-elect Obama would take the oath 
of office.    
Conclusions 
Implementation of NSPS has taken place in a policy environment that is much different from that of the time 
when NSPS was formulated and enacted.  In 2004, a Republican administration and Republican-controlled 
Congress were successful in drafting and enacting legislation to overhaul the DoD civilian personnel system in 
the name of national security.  Promoting reform in the name of national security instilled a sense of urgency 
that convinced Congress to grant the Department far reaching powers over the objections of organized labor.  
As time passed, however, some of the factors that contributed to the legislative success of NSPS either were 
fading from memory—national security was no longer a policymakers’ ‘trump card’—and others became 
liabilities; for example, general language and broad grants of authority made congressional intent difficult to 
discern. This became an issue when the details of NSPS were revealed. Moreover, as shown in our previous 
reports, the policy making process did not produce a consensus for reform among key stakeholders in the 
personnel management policy community. Thus, the unions and their supporters continued the fight over 
NSPS during the implementation phase, first by moving the policy debate to a different venue: the courts. The 
courts slowed NSPS implementation, and it became politically vulnerable when both houses of Congress came 
under Democratic control in 2006. Union leaders gained political traction in the Democratic Congress, and 
Congress began to look at changing or eliminating NSPS. 
 
Nevertheless, DoD was undeterred in its efforts to implement NSPS where it could. The strategic pause may 
have changed the timeline to a somewhat slower pace, but the shift to the PEO structure put NSPS 
implementation into an established system whose processes for implementation pushed forward even as 
criticism and change was coming from outside the Department.  
 
Although the political tide seemed to have turned against NSPS, there is inadequate evidence to conclude 
whether or not the system has reached its intended objectives.  Nearly all of the studies produced at 
Congress’ request concluded that due to the low number of employees who have been converted and the 
short timeframe of NSPS implementation, it is unwarranted to make a conclusion about the efficacy of NSPS.   
 
On January 16, 2009, DoD was still moving forward to implement NSPS even as they awaited a new 
presidential administration and the possibility of a new direction in civilian personnel management.
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Postscript 
President Obama was sworn into office on January 20, 2009.  On Inauguration Day, the Obama White House 
issued a memorandum that froze the advancement of any pending programs from the previous 
administration.  The memo instructed agency and department leadership that “no proposed or final 
regulation should be sent to the Office of the Federal Register (the ‘OFR’) for publication unless and until it 
has been reviewed and approved by a department or agency head appointed or designated by the President 
after noon on January 20, 2009, or in the case of the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense.”237  This 
memo effectively froze the advancement of any programs for which regulations had not been published by 
the Bush Administration.  NSPS final regulations had been published four days prior to the issuance of this 
memo; however, the regulations had not yet gone into effect, and consequently NSPS was effectively frozen 
from expanding or implementing the finalized regulations without review from the Obama Administration. 
 
Congressional leaders maintained their opposition to NSPS and urged the Administration to freeze or end 
NSPS.  A February 11, 2009, letter from Congressmen Ike Skelton (Chairman of the House Armed Services 
Committee) and Solomon Ortiz (Chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee) to Secretary Gates stressed that 
“because it will take some time for a review and a determination of the best course of action to occur, we urge 
you to immediately halt the conversion of any additional employees to NSPS at any level or any location until 
the Administration and Congress can properly address the future of the Department’s personnel system.”  
The Congressmen argued that NSPS created “distrust and discontent” among DoD employees, and that the 
President should follow through on his campaign assurance to unions that he would consider a repeal or 
complete overhaul of NSPS.238   
 
OPM released a report on February 11, 2009, that concluded that the DoD “has built a strong foundation for 
implementing its performance-based personnel system and provides consistent approach for supporting the 
National Security Personnel System across its agencies that have adopted it.”239 However, the report indicated 
that “a growing number of employees do not trust the system to ensure fairness in pay or performance 
ratings.”240 In the report the OPM confirmed what was suggested in a 2008 GAO report on workforce 
attitudes, performance system safeguards and accountability mechanisms that “when there is a major change 
to a personnel system, employee attitudes and perceptions typically decline initially as it generally takes from 
three to five years for employees to fully understand and accept the new system.241   
 
On March 16, 2009, Deputy Defense Secretary William J. Lynn III announced that DoD and OPM initiated a 
complete review of NSPS.  The review would address Congressional and union concerns of NSPS by focusing 
on NSPS’s “fairness, transparency, underlying policies, and effectiveness.”242  In his April 1 testimony before 
the readiness subcommittee, Bradley Bunn said that the review could take months and that DoD would not 
advance NSPS until the review was complete.243  In response to the DoD’s decision, eight Democratic 
Congressional leaders244 signed an April 3 letter to OPM Director Peter Orszag commending the 
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Administration’s decision to freeze NSPS, and urging the Administration “to put on hold further advancement 
of any pay-for-performance measures in the federal government and conduct a government-wide review to 
determine the best way forward to improve performance management while preserving merit principles.”245 
Orszag responded on May 29 to the letter saying “the Administration does not feel that it is necessary at this 
time to put an across-the-board hold on further advancement of other pay-for-performance systems in the 
Federal government,” but that “the Administration will not support any pay system that is unfair or has the 
effect of suppressing wages or discriminating against employees.”246 
 
Secretary Lynn and OPM Director John Berry announced on May 14, 2009 that the Defense Business Board 
(DBB) was asked to form a task group to review NSPS.  Lynn wrote in his instructions to the DBB that the 
“task group should deliver recommendations aimed at helping the department determine if the underlying 
design principles and methodology for implementation are reflected in the program objectives, whether the 
program objectives are being met, and whether NSPS is operating in a fair, transparent and effective 
manner.”247  The Task Group was chaired by Rudy DeLeon and consisted of two other members, Robert 
Tobias and Michael Bayer.  COL Kevin Doxey served as the task group’s Secretariat Representative.248 
 
After extensive examination of NSPS, the Task Group released its findings on August 25, 2009. The Task 
Group reviewed a number of sources from within DoD, Congress, public panels and unions.  The Task Group 
presented seven recommendations for DoD and OPM regarding NSPS: 
 Initiate a reconstruction of NSPS within DoD that begins with a challenge to the assumptions and 
design of NSPS…A ‘fix’ could not address the depth of the systemic problems discovered. The Task 
Force does not recommend an abolishment of NSPS because the performance management system 
that has been created is achieving alignment of employee goals with organizational goals. 
  Reestablish a DoD commitment to partnership and collaborating with employees through their 
unions. 
 Establish DoD’s commitment to strategic management and investment in career civil servants. 
 Continue the existing moratorium on transitions of more work units into NSPS until DoD can present 
a corrective action plan to address identified issues, supported by data that the implemented 
corrective actions will address the identified issues. 
 The following areas of identified concern must be addressed: Pay pool, pay bands, trust, and best 
practices. 
 Continued GAO monitoring of NSPS implementation, with specific analysis of indicators of 
unintended Equal Employment Opportunity consequences in the NSPS workforce, would be 
beneficial. 
 Create a collaborative process for DoD managers and employees currently in the General Schedule 
system to design and implement a performance management system that ties individual employee 
performance goals to organizational goals. Explore the replacement or the current General Schedule 
classification system.249 
 
Robert Tobias conceded in an interview that “[NSPS] should be reconstructed from scratch.”250 In response to 
the Task Group’s findings, William Dougan, President of the National Federation of Federal Employees, said 
“the Pentagon has had six years to get NSPS right, and they have failed miserably to do so.  If the 
recommendation is to scrap NSPS as it exists today, we should not bother creating a new NSPS in its place.”251 
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While the Task Group’s review was underway, Congressional leaders were actively moving to end NSPS 
through the National Defense Authorization Act FY 2010.  Representative Carol Shea-Porter (D-NH) 
introduced an amendment in June that would mandate that all NSPS employees receive 100 percent of the GS 
annual raise; “require the Defense Secretary to prepare to end to controversial system, or submit a report to 
Congress demonstrating why it should remain”; and abolish NSPS within a year unless Congress decided to 
act on it.252 The Administration did not voice an opinion on the amendment to end NSPS, and only threatened 
to veto NDAA FY2010 due to the inclusion of funding for F-22s despite the Department’s opposition to the 
program.  Prompted by the amendment, in September 2009, the Department announced that in light of the 
ongoing review and concerns with NSPS employees covered by NSPS would receive the same salary 
adjustment as their GS counterparts.253 
 
The conference committee working on the NDAA FY 2010 released a report of the final legislation on October 
7, 2009, that called for the repeal of the law that authorized NSPS and the reconversion of all employees 
covered by NSPS back to the GS system by January 1, 2012. Senator Daniel Akaka (D-Hawaii) praised the 
conference committee’s decision and said “I am pleased my fellow Armed Service conferees agreed that it is 
time to end this short-sighted policy, which threatens the rights and protections of the DoD civilian 
workforce.  Employees throughout the federal government, especially those charged with defending the 
nation, deserve a fair personnel system.  I believe this agreement will more appropriately protect DoD 
employee rights while giving DoD the additional performance management and hiring flexibility it needs.”254  
The agreement required the Secretary of Defense to begin returning the 200,000 NSPS employees to the GS 
system within six months of the law’s enactment.  The conference report also required that “no employee 
shall suffer any loss of or decrease in pay” when they revert to the GS system.255  “While the conference report 
does not give the Defense Secretary authority to establish a new pay system unilaterally, it does direct him to 
make substantial changes to performance management within the department.”256  The agreement also gives 
the Secretary the authority to create a “Department of Defense Civilian Workforce Incentive Fund” that can be 
used to award employee performance, and hiring/retention bonuses for Defense employees.   
 
President Obama signed NDAA FY 2010 into law on October 28, 2009, which set the timetable for the 
destruction of NSPS and the reversion of NSPS employees to the GS system.  Tim Curry, acting NSPS-PEO, said, 
“The Department is going to proceed deliberately and cautiously without unnecessary delay,” and that the 
transition back to GS would take place organization by organization.257 
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254 Alyssa Rosenberg.  “Congress Moves to Repeal Pentagon Pay-for-Performance System.” Government Executive. (October 7, 2009). 
255 Alyssa Rosenberg (Oct 7, 2009) 
256 Alyssa Rosenberg (Oct 7, 2009) 
257 Tim Curry quoted in: Jim Garamone. “Act Ends Controversial Personnel System.” American Forces Press Service. (October 28, 2009). 
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NSPS Implementation Timeline 
2003 
Nov 24 – National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 108-136, becomes effective, providing authority to 
establish NSPS.    
 
Dec 1 – NSPS Implementation Office established.  
 
Dec 19 - First meeting of NSPS Implementation Team 
• Pursue aggressive policy of including all of DoD within two year period 
• FWS and NSPS HR proposal for unions are initial projects 
• One system – no Army, Navy or AF version 
• Team will develop overall training plan and basic module to deliver the training 
 
2004 
Jan 5-10 - Labor Relations Working Group meets on the bargaining process  
 
Jan 6-7 - Meeting with Ogilvy/SRA on NSPS marketing strategy 
 
Jan 14 – Staff Meeting  
• Training Group convened Jan 16 to review training strategy 
 
Jan 15 – Tim Curry, Staff Director for Labor and Employee Relations, CPMS FAS, telephones eight unions with 
national consultation rights and one without national consultation rights advising them of letter inviting them to a 
meeting on the DoD labor relations system   
 
Jan 16 – NSPS HR Proposal Development Team Meeting 
• Initially established a completion date based on Jan 31 delivery to unions 
 
Jan 16 – Date of the letters notifying the unions of the Jan 22 meeting on DoD’s labor relations system 
 
Jan 20 – Collaboration/Proposal/Implementation Process milestones established 
• NSPS HR Proposal provided to unions- scheduled March 23 to begin collaborative process 
• Overall collaboration process (respond to union questions, meet with union to reach agreement, notify 
Congress of implementation) scheduled for March 23 – Aug 6 
• NSPS Implementation scheduled for October 1 
 
Jan 22 – Initial meeting with unions (Ginger Groeber, Charlie Rogers, Marilee Fitzgerald, Brad Bunn, and Tim Curry 
representing DoD) to discuss the procedures to be used to collaborate on the NSPS labor relations system.  Unions 
requested a written outline of what DoD would propose changing regarding labor relations rules.  Outline would 
be basis for discussion for next meeting in February. 
 
Feb 6 – DoD unions are provided by e-mail or fax a document entitled “National Security Personnel System Pre-
Collaboration Labor Relations System Options”  
 
Feb 11 – Reg/Mod BP Meeting  
• Schedule conversion of 300,000 civilian employees by Oct 04 
• Focus on white collar (GS/GM) conversion by Oct 4 
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Feb 12 – SECDEF Rumsfeld designates SEC England to be serve as the interface with unions concerning the 
development and implementation of the NSPS labor relations system  
 
Feb 12 – Draft of NSPS human resources management proposal provided for review 
 
Feb 17-20 – Meeting/Discussion of Supervisory Architecture/Pay 
• Development of supervisory adjustment and basic criteria 
 
Feb 18 – Staff Meeting 
• Brad Bunn’s initial meeting with Gordon England (main problem: no comprehensive program to deal 
with media, unions, etc. on NSPS) 
• Bunn needs supervisory adjustment proposal by Feb 20 
 
Feb 22 – George Nesterczuk begins work as OPM senior advisor to NSPS 
 
Feb 23 – Draft NSPS Proposal finalized 
 
Feb 23 – Brief of Executive Steering Group (Groeber, Rogers, etc.) by Dennis Turner on Proposed Supervisory 
Adjustment 
 
Feb 26-27 – DoD and OPM meeting with DoD unions at Hyatt Hotel, Rosslyn, on the labor relations system options.   
• Unions are strongly opposed to the concept document provided to them prior to the meeting. 
 
Feb 27 – On second day of meeting, DoD unions develop a letter to “All Members of Congress” protesting the 
concepts presented to the unions  
• Letter from Chris Van Hollen and Frank Wolf, et al 
• Letter from Representative Henry Waxman, Senator Joseph Lieberman, et al 
• Letter from Senator Frank Lautenberg, Senator Joseph Biden, et al 
 
Mar 1 – OPM/OMB Briefing Meeting (George Nesterczuk, Ron Sanders, Jeff Goldstein, etc.) 
• Issues:  
o Cannot presume FLSA exempt/nonexempt for all positions in a specific CG/level;  
o Lack of restraints on pay setting within band – need guidance;  
o SSR needs clarification;  
o Need additional technical information of pay retention;  
o Pay pool budgeting;  
o Disagree with only 30% vets floating to top of category in which they are rated/appears no 
preference is given to anyone other than 30% veterans.   
• NSPS HR Proposal was to be provided to unions on March 23 as the statutory regulation;  
o Discussed: either issue proposals as internal DoD regulations (DoD Civilian Personnel Manual) or 
as CFR regs.  If issued as internal regulations, they would not be released until after statutory 
collaboration (Summer 04)   
 
Mar 2 – OMB Comments received 
• Annual pay raises (performance and scheduled) that exceed President’s guidance for GPI 
• Width of CG1 pay band 
• Cost of supervisory adjustment 
• Budgeting WGI buy in 
 
Mar 9 – OPM Memo to Defense Secy Rumsfeld Providing Comments to NSPS Draft HR Proposal  
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Mar 11 – OPM Comments meeting 
OPM Issues: 
• NSPS proposal diminishes veterans’ preference, e.g., proposal eliminates protection for veterans under 
RIF unless they have the most severe service-connected disabilities 
• NSPS proposal does not take full advantage of flexibilities afforded DoD, and may pressure DHS to pull 
back some innovative parts of their personnel system 
• DoD’s labor-management proposal was developed without OPM involvement or union input 
• NSPS should be established by “regulations jointly prescribed”, i.e., joint publication of proposed NSPS 
regs in the Federal Register   
 
Mar 12 – Secy Rumsfeld directs the establishment of a strategic and comprehensive review of NSPS development.    
 
Mar 17- Initial Structuring and Meeting of the Strategic Engagement Teams    
• Teams established to re-think the NSPS structure and mission as it relates to individual DoD stakeholders  
• Requirements Team (Pat Adams – Navy) 
• Personnel Team (Dave Snyder – Army) 
• Process Team (Roger Blanchard – Air Force) 
• Program Team (Pete Brown – Navy) 
• Communications Team (Eric Ruff – OSD, Public Affairs) 
o Participating NSPS staff:   
 Brad Bunn – Requirements, Program, Process 
 Sharon Stewart – Requirements, Program 
 Stephanie Olson - Communications 
 Janice Lander, Helen Sullivan, Judy Mayrose – Process 
 Paula Hartzoge - Program 
 
Apr 1 – Secy Chu and Secy England open letter to DoD workforce on strategic engagement. 
 
Apr 7 – Strategic Engagement Brief to Navy Secy Gordon England and Dr. Chu on NSPS Design Recommendations 
 
Apr13 – NSPS Implementation Recommendations presented to Senior Level Review Group – Defense Secy 
Rumsfeld approves the recommendations  
 
Apr 15 – Secy England introduces to DoD personnel at Pentagon the NSPS Design and Implementation Brief; Pete 
Brown, Program Team Lead, provides brief   
 
Apr 19 – NSPS Design and Implementation Plan briefed to Union Representatives by Secy England 
 
Apr 27 – Secy England Announces Program Executive Office for NSPS Created 
• Pete Brown, Executive Director at NAVSEA, appointed as Interim Program Executive Officer 
• Dave Snyder, Army HR Director, named as Interim Director of Labor Relations and Appeal Process Team 
• Brad Bunn named as Interim Director of Human Resources and Pay-for-Performance Team  
 
Apr 30 – Pete Brown chairs initial Component Program Managers Meeting           
• Discussion of interim PEO operating strategy  
• Discussion of interim PEO roles, responsibilities, and expectations 
• Work plans for specific project areas are presented by NSPS members 
 
May 7 – Program Managers Meeting 
Appendix A  
 
©2009    Center for Defense Management Research       
             38 
• Feedback provided on May 6 Secy England meeting 
•  Update on OIPT issues, PEO admin matters (e.g. PEO organization chart, staffing, etc.), HR planning team 
meetings, and LR and Appeals work group 
• Emphasis on discussion of six union consultation sessions and need to start focus on pilot program and IT 
  
May 12 – Draft of NSPS Requirements Document provided to PEO members for review and comment  
 
May 19 – DEPSECDEF officially delegates authority for NSPS Senior Executive to Secretary England 
 
May 21 –  PEO-NSPS Staff Meeting 
• Planned re-launch of NSPS web site after June 7 union meeting  
 
May 24 – Secy England names Mary E. Lacey, technical director of Naval Surface Warfare Center, as program 
executive officer for NSPS (news release) 
 
May 26 – Pete Brown, Interim PEO, extends e-mail invitations to all DoD unions to meet with DoD and OPM in 
Crystal City.  Purpose of meeting is to: 
 Establish desired outcomes for this and future meetings 
 Understand working groups, focus groups, union meetings and timelines 
 Provide opportunity for unions to share concerns on process and timelines    
 
May 27 – Secy England approves formal NSPS OIPT charter 
 
May 27 – Pete Brown Memo on Union Dialogue for Senior Leaders 
 
Jun 4 – PEO-NSPS Staff Meeting 
• Web site “release” planned for June 8; existing NSPS web text requires review and editing prior to release  
 
Jun 7- First consultation session with union leaders representing DoD personnel on NSPS is held; session co-hosted 
by Charles Abell,  Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (P&R) and George Nesterczuk, OPM 
 Unions indicate that discussion of current human resources system, appeals process, and labor relations 
system is too broad 
 DoD agrees to provide unions with information on what changes in the current system, and NSPS impact 
on bargaining units and Chapter 71, title 5   
    
 Jun 8 – Mary Lacey physically on board as PEO for the NSPS staff meeting to discuss 7 June Consultation  
 
Jun 8 – Revised NSPS Web Site launched  
 
Jun 14 – Brad Bunn selected as the Deputy PEO for NSPS (memo) 
 
Jun 24 – In response to the unions’ June 7 request for information to identify the problems in the current system, 
DoD unions receive a document, “Interests and Concerns about Current Human Resources Management System” 
 
Jun 25 – PEO-NSPS Staff Meeting 
• Received “thumbs up” from OPM on NSPS requirements document 
 
Jun 29 – Second in a series of consultation sessions with DoD, OPM, and union leaders. 
           
Jun 30 – PEO-NSPS Staff Meeting (Update of June 29 union meeting)  
• Conveyed to unions that NSPS is not eliminating Chapter 71  
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• Union plans to address concerns and suggestions on focus/work groups by COB July 2 
• AFL-CIO becomes active participant at end of meeting 
• OIPT told that pilot sessions will contain no bargaining unit employees  
 
Jul 1 – DoD unions provide DoD and OPM with a written proposal that is concerned with how the proposed NSPS 
regulation on Human Resources, Appeals, and Labor-Management Relations should be developed 
 
Jul 7 – Mary Lacey e-mails a letter to Byron Charlton, AFL-CIO, emphasizing that the procedures proposed and 
discussed at the June 7 and 29 meetings offered the unions opportunities to provide input and to have that input 
fully considered in the development of the NSPS regulations   
 
Jul 7 – Pentagon Town Hall Meeting on NSPS hosted by Secy England 
 
Jul 8 – Byron Charlton response to the July 7 e-mail indicates that the unions object to DoD’s plan to proceed with 
focus groups 
 
Jul 6-8 – Three initial pilot Focus Groups meet   
 
Jul 9 – Mary Lacey responds to the union coalition objections to focus groups by offering to schedule a discussion 
with a small group on how to proceed with the discussions on NSPS  
 
Jul 14 – Mary Lacey and Brad Bunn have initial meeting with Charlie Rogers, CPMS Director, and Cheryl Fuller, 
Regionalization and Systems Modernization (RegMod) Div., CPMS   
 
Jul 16 – PEO-NSPS Staff Meeting 
• 89 responses to NSPS questions put on web site July 15  
• Work group schedules presented for July 27-29 
• Army and Navy (D. Snyder and K. Ott) discuss experiences with Town Hall meetings 
• Discuss with Defense Business Board on hiring PR firm to present NSPS core message 
 
Jul 28 – Memo from PEO to all component Program Managers: 
• Mary Lacey requests service component nominations for NSPS Spiral One. 
• Requests “highly motivated, high performing organizations” to nominate themselves by 31 August, 2004. 
 
Jul 28 – PEO Working Groups convene at One Lafayette Center, Washington, DC to develop and explore options 
and alternatives as the basis for NSPS design ( since May labor relations, adverse actions and appeals working 
groups had also been meeting in a separate location. 
 
• Compensation Architecture – Dennis Turner 
• Hiring/Assignment/Workforce Shaping – Karen Lebing 
• Performance Management – Jim Irwin 
• Employee Engagement – Steve Sommers 
 
Aug 16 – Sec England formally charters PEO 
 
Aug 16 – Twelve-page document that outlines various issues and provides some potential design options for NSPS 
Labor Management Relations and Employee Appeals is presented to DoD union representatives 
 
Aug 24 – DoD union coalition provides a written response to the Aug 16 document by reiterating that the unions’ 
position that the labor relations system must operate within the constraints of Chapter 71, and asks DoD and OPM 
to justify each identified interest and concern  
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Aug 25/26 – DoD/OPM consultation meeting with the DoD unions focuses on labor relations and appeals.  Working 
groups are briefly discussed; no request to participate in these groups is made by the unions   
 
Sep 3 – DoD unions are provided a document that outlines various issues and some potential design options for 
the NSPS Human Resources system    
 
Sep 9 – PEO distributes HR Options paper for Capitol Hill, unions, website  
 
Sep 9 – Deputy PEO sends draft Focus Group report and supplemental background on LR/Appeals to employee 
representatives 
 
Sep 9 – DoD responds to the Aug 24 union coalition statement regarding the NSPS Labor Relations System and 
Employee Appeals process  
 
Sep 9 – DoD and OPM conduct a meeting with DoD unions identified as non-coalition unions and focus on labor 
relations and appeals (NAIL and FOP attend) 
 
Sep 10 – DoD/OPM consultation meeting with the DoD coalition unions intends to focus on the document 
“Discussion of Human Resources Options and Union Interests and Concerns”, but is spent discussing NSPS timeline 
and process due to issues raised by the unions.      
 
Sep 14 – PEO formally charters SAG 
 
Sep 14 – Non-coalition unions invited to attend DoD/OPM meeting regarding “Discussion of Human Resource 
Options and Union Interests and Concerns” (NAIL and FOP attend)    
 
Sep 16 – PEO Working Groups disband and initial brief of PEO Working Group options provided to OIPT 
 
Sep 22 – DoD/OPM consultation meeting with non-coalition unions 
 
Sep 25 – NSPS Requirements Document approved and signed by Secy England  
 
Oct 1 – All DoD unions are provided a copy of the NSPS Requirements Document 
 
Oct 5 – DoD/OPM consultation meeting with the DoD coalition unions focuses on their request for an advance 
copy of the NSPS regulations, a discussion of the Human Resources system, and the working groups; unions are 
advised that working groups are no longer formally meeting, but that working group members attend the union 
meetings, and that changes have already been made to options based on union input     
 
Oct 14-15 – Individual Work Group experts (leaders) provide presentations at OIPT HR Decision Brief 
 
Nov 10 – OIPT Recommendations to the Senior Executive 
 
Nov 19 – draft NSPS enabling regulation sent to OIPT for review 
 
Nov – PBD 704 (page 32) funds PEO-NSPS for FY05 through FY11, including program development, DCPDS system 
modifications, and office administration 
 
Dec 1 – Financial Management function implemented in PEO with full time program lead detailed 
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Dec 13 – DoD/OPM meeting with DoD non-coalition unions focuses on the impact of pay banding and pay-for-
performance on firefighter and law enforcement pay (NAIL and FOP attend) 
 
Dec 14 – DoD/OPM consultation meeting with the DoD coalition unions focuses on:  
• the timetable for coalition input into the NSPS design 
• the coalition response to DoD’s Sep 9 letter 
• the Spiral One implementation 
 
Dec 15 – Pentagon press conference announcing Spiral One  
• Secretary England announces that Spiral One will be rolled out in three phases over an 18-month period 
beginning as early as July 2005.   
o Spiral One includes GS, GM, Acquisition Demonstration project employees in the Continental US, 
Alaska and Hawaii, up to 300,000 employees.   
 
2005 
Jan 13 – DoD coalition unions submit recommendations and comments concerning NSPS  
 
Jan 21 - Secy Rumsfeld meets with Secy England and certifies draft enabling regulation for OMB submission  
 
Jan 30  – Kay Cole James, OPM Director, certifies draft enabling regulation 
 
Feb 10 – Secretary England and OPM Acting Director Dan Blair hold press conference on the soon to be published 
NSPS proposed regulations. 
 
Feb 10 – DoD and OPM conduct informational briefing at OPM for union representative on soon to be published 
NSPS proposed regulations.   
 
Feb 11 – PEO formally charters Financial Management IPT  
 
Feb 14 – NSPS proposed regulations issued for employee representative and public review and comment  
 
Feb 14 - PEO provides cost estimate ($158 million) to implement NSPS 
 
Mar 9 – Sec England approves NSPS financial policies covering base pay adjustments upon conversion to NSPS, 
January 2006 pay adjustments for Spiral 1.1 employees, and protection of pay pool funding  
 
Mar 10 – DoD and OPM meet with unions to discuss the meet and confer process and procedures   
 
Mar 15 – Senate Subcommittee on oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce and the District 
of Columbia Hearing on NSPS  
• Witnesses: Charles Abell, Principal Deputy for Personnel and Readiness and Co-Chair of the OIPT, and 
George Nesterczuk, Senior Advisor to the Director of OPM on defense matters.  
 
Mar 16 – Review and comment period for proposed regulations ends – comment consolidation for NSPS website 
begins 
 
Mar 28 – Congressional notification provided on meet and confer  
 
Apr 8 – NSPS/Labor Management consultation to discuss meet and confer schedule and process 
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Apr 12 – House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Federal Workforce and Agency 
Organization Hearing on NSPS  
• Witnesses: Charles Abell and George Nesterczuk. 
 
Apr 14 – Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on NSPS 
• DoD Witness: Hon. Gordon England, Secy of the Navy and NSPS Senior Executive, and Dan Blair, Acting 
Director of OPM. 
 
Apr 18 - NSPS/Labor Management Collaboration Meeting (California/Texas Rooms) as meet and confer process 
officially begins with first face-to-face meeting between the DoD/OPM team and union representatives 
 
Apr19-22/Apr 25-28 – Additional face-to-face meet and confer sessions 
 
May 3-4/May 9-10/May 16-19 – Additional face-to-face meet and confer sessions 
 
May 5-6/May 11-13 – Union only meeting days for meet and confer issues 
 
May 13 – President designates Secy England as Acting Secy of Defense 
 
May 23 – Meet and Confer extended to June 2 
 
Jun 1-2 – DoD/OPM face-to-face meetings with unions are concluded 
 
Jun 12 – Brad Bunn assumes “dual-hatted” role as both CPMS Director and Deputy PEO  
 
Jun 16 - Secy England and Acting Director of OPM, Dan Blair, meet with 16 union representatives to discuss the 
proposed NSPS regulations.  
• United Defense Workers Coalition presented Secy England with a paper outlining their recommended 
changes to the proposed regulations.   
• Secy England and Mr. Blair state their commitment to reviewing the unions’ recommendations and giving 
them full consideration. (Meeting considered as concluding meet and confer.)  
 
Jun 23 – RegMod releases instructions for coding positions with a Pre-NSPS Spiral Indicator.  These codes are to be 
assigned to both Position and Person and allow tracking NSPS participants with a specific spiral increment prior to 
and after conversion.   
 
Jun 28 – Linda Springer sworn in as OPM Director 
 
Jul – GAO Report to Congressional Committees: Human Capital—DOD’s National Security Personnel System Faces 
Implementation Challenges 
 
Jul 14 – England-Blair letter to Byron Charlton, United DoD Workers Coalition  
 
Jul 15  – PEO formally announces the release of the web-based Readiness Assessment Tool for Spiral 1.1 units.  
• Tool has 10 topical areas outlining the major tasks to be completed prior to conversion and after 
conversion to NSPS.   PEO monitoring of progress will be via the tool.  
 
Jul 20 – ICF Consulting provides final compilation report (hard copy and electronic) of the major public comments 
to the NSPS proposed regulation 
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Jul 29 – Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Abell announces he has 
accepted Senator Warners’s offer to be Staff Director for the Senate Armed Services Committee.   
 
Aug 12 – U.S. District Court Judge Rosemary Collyer rules that DHS personnel system does not adequately provide 
for collective bargaining 
 
Aug 29 – Appointment of Michael Dominguez as co-chair of NSPS OIPT 
 
Oct 7 – Collyer rules that DHS cannot streamline its personnel system until DHS collective bargaining produces a 
contract agreeable to the unions  
 
Oct 24 – PEO receives final OMB clearance on the final NSPS regulations  
 
Oct 26 – Secy England and OPM Director Linda Springer press conference announces availability of final NSPS 
regulations and the notification of Congress--Secy England Memo to the NSPS Workforce 
 
Oct 27 – NSPS final regulations filed with Federal Register for publication and 30 –day congressional notification 
period begins 
 
Nov 1 – NSPS final regulations published by Federal Register 
 
Nov 7 – Ten unions file lawsuit with Judge Emmet Sullivan, U.S. District Court, to stop NSPS implementation (AFGE 
et al vs Rumsfeld et al) 
 
Nov 16 – Unions reach agreement with Dept of Justice, DoD, and OPM to delay implementation of major portions 
of NSPS until Feb 1, 2006.  DoD and unions request a court hearing in January 2006 on the lawsuit. 
 
Nov 17 – Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee conducts NSPS hearing with Secy 
England , Brad Bunn , Linda Springer, and George Nesterczuk.  
 
Nov 18 – Secy England approves NSPS pay pool funding policy establishing single DoD-wide minimum pay pool 
funding floor  
 
Nov 23 – January 24, 2006 – hearing date scheduled on union lawsuit against NSPS 
 
Nov 23 – Draft NSPS implementing regulations made available to the public  
 
Nov 29 – PEO Memo to NSPS OIPT and Program Managers informing them delayed implementation of portions of 
NSPS until Feb 1, 2006, and the case hearing scheduled for Jan 24, 2006    
 
Dec 1 and 2- PEO conducts information briefings for union representatives on draft implementing regulations   
 
Dec 5- Federal Education Association, Inc. (FEA) files suit against DoD and OPM.  FEA represents teachers and 
support staff in domestic and overseas schools.   
 
Dec 13 - PEO (T. Curry, J. Hansohn, D. Turner, et. al.) conducts continuing collaboration session by teleconference 
with three Fraternal Order of Police (F.O.P.) members    
 
Dec 23 – PEO Memo to NSPS Program Managers informing them of PEO focus on re-evaluation of performance 
management and placing hold on January NSPS-specific content training.   
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Dec 28 – PBD 723 (pages 14-15) funds National Security Labor Relations Board (NSLRB) for FY06 through FY11 
 
Dec 29 – Acting Deputy Defense Secy England relinquishes Navy Secy post 
 
Dec 30 – DoD received comments from United Department of Defense Workers Coalition on proposed 
implementing issuances. 
 
Dec 30 – President signs FY06 NDAA; start-up of NSLRB now possible 
 
2006 
Jan 5 – PEO briefs OIPT and receives additional direction on projected work plan for the Performance Management 
System (PMS) Redesign and Spiral 1 Deployment  
 
Jan 12 – OIPT approves a reduced Spiral 1.1 implementation plan 
 
Jan 24 – Judge Emmet Sullivan, U.S. District Court, accepts a deal to rule on the merits of the union lawsuit (AFGE 
v. Rumsfeld) by March 1 (thereby delaying NSPS implementation until at least that date); although the PEO can 
begin standing up the NSLRB, there is no information yet as to when that may begin  
 
Jan 31 – PEO sends memo to Dep Secy requesting that Dep Secy determine the effective date for establishing the 
NSLRB    
 
Feb 1 – Dep Secy England approves PEO memo requesting the determination of the effective date of the 
establishment of the NSLRB and the issuance of interim rules for the Board’s operation    
 
Feb 15-16 – As part of the continuing collaboration process, PEO conducts training for union reps on the NSPS HR 
Elements, including a brief on the proposed performance management system design. 
 
Feb 27 – U.S. District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan hands down court opinion that NSPS fails to ensure collective 
bargaining rights, does not provide independent third-party review of labor relations decisions, and would leave 
employees without a fair process for appealing disciplinary actions.   
 
Feb 28 – NSPS OIPT meets with OSD Counsel Helen Sullivan and unanimously agrees to implement a previously-
approved contingency strategy--moving quickly to appeal the District Court ruling.  OIPT authorizes Ms. Sullivan to 
ask the Dept of Justice to proceed with an appeal; estimates the appeal process will take about one year to play 
through to a conclusion. 
 
Mar 17 – Formatted NSPS draft implementing issuances provided to NSPS PMs.     
 
Mar 24 – Union Coalition responds on proposed NSPS  performance management system with comments  
 
Mar 27 – Website release of HR Elements for Managers, Supervisors, and Employees: A Guide to NSPS 
(HRMagazineS1.1) 
 
Mar 28-30 – Spiral 1.1 Train the Trainer (T3) sessions held at DFAS, Columbus, Ohio. 
 
April 3 – Website release of introductory course, NSPS 101 . 
 
April 17 – Department of Justice files Notice of Appeal  on behalf of DoD and OPM to the U.S. District Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia circuit court. 
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 Apr 26 – Deputy PEO notifies unions that the Department has completed continuing collaboration and in the 
response to their comments and recommendations, informs them of the disposition. 
 
Apr 28 – DepSecDef England approves NSPS Financial Management Policies for Spiral 1.1   
 
Apr 28 – DepSecDef England signs the directive implementing portions of the National Security Personnel System 
effective April 30, 2006.   
• The directive established the NSPS Implementing Issuances, or Subchapters, for the Human Resources 
elements of NSPS and provides the details for carrying out certain provisions of the NSPS regulations.    
 
Apr 30 – Spiral implementation commences.  
 
May 1-5 – Spiral 1.1 completed on time to include the conversion of 4,258 Navy employees along with almost 
7,000 other DoD employees. 
 
Jun 13-16 – PEO convenes an NSPS Spiral 2 Planning Team in Rosslyn to develop the overarching strategy, to 
identify and resolve any high-level issues, and to insure an integrated approach in the development of the 
expanded NSPS HR system. 
 
Jun 21-22 – PEO conducts Spiral 1.1 Lessons Learned Workshop 
 
Jun 22 – CPMS Director’s memo announcing CPMS implementation of NSPS in January 2007 
 
Jun 27 – U.S. Court of appeals for the District of Columbia rules that the Homeland Security Department’s new 
personnel system violates laws guaranteeing workers the right to collectively bargain with their employers over 
workplace matters.      
 
Jul 18-Aug 1 – Hiring/Workforce Shaping/Pay Administration Working Groups under the NSPS Spiral 2 initiative 
meet during this time frame on the design of the NSPS blue collar system.    
 
Aug 10 – Dept. of Justice on behalf of DoD files opening appeal brief with U.S. District Court of Appeals regarding 
the January 27 Sullivan decision.  
 
Oct 1 – Spiral 1.2 commences implementation. 
 
Oct 26 – Meeting with the unions as part of the continuing collaboration obligations regarding the FWS design. 
Briefings highlight the proposed design options. 
 
Dec 11—  An oral argument is scheduled with the U.S. Court of Appeals. 
 
Dec 22 – PEO receives newly modified NSPS assessment criteria for review. 
 
2007 
Jan 18 – Teleconference with OPM on Jan 16 assessment criteria finally spawns agreement and overall NSPS 
review schedule is discussed.  
 
Jan 31 – Sen. George V. Voinovich introduces S. 457 to extend the date on which the NSPS will first apply to certain 
defense laboratories until 2011. Bill was cosponsored by Sens. Shrod Brown, D-Ohio; Jeff Sessions, R – Alabama; 
Jeff Bingaman, D – New Mexico; Hillary Clinton, D-New York; Pete V. Domenici, R- New Mexico; Edward M. 
Kennedy, D-Massachusetts; Joe Lieberman, D-Connecticut; Trent Lott, R-Mississippi; and Jack Reed, D-Rhode 
Island. 
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Feb 18 - Spiral 1.2j, last of the Spiral 1.2 increments, is implemented. 
 
Mar 1 – Secy of USN Donald Winter testified before the Committee on House Armed Services.  
• more than 50,000 employees are schedule to transition to NSPS from GS at the start of FY 2008. 
 
Mar 2 – Rep Solomon P. Ortiz (D-Texas) and other members of the House Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee 
announces the beginning of Congressional oversight over the NSPS.  This is the first oversight of the system.   
• A hearing date is set for March 6 and hear testimony from: Dep Under Secy of Defense P&R Michael Luis 
Dominguez; John Gage, National President, AFGE; Max Stier, President and CEO, Partnership for Public 
Service; and Dr. Marick Masters, Professor of Business, Katz Graduate school of Business. 
 
Mar 2 – Serco Inc. wins a contract to provide training to military and civilian employees on the NSPS.  
 
Mar 6 – Spiral 1.3 commences implementation.    
 
Mar 6 – The House Armed Services readiness subcommittee debated the new National Security Personnel System  
• In addition, the House Appropriations Financial Services and General Government subcommittee, a new  
panel, held a hearing on "issues in the federal workforce." 
 
Mar 28 – Under Secy of Defense (P&R) David S. C. Chu testifies before the Committee on Senate Armed Services 
Subcommittee on Personnel. 
• NSPS allows managers to take constructive steps to match the workforce to the demands of the 
workplace 
• Provides a performance management system that aligns performance objectives with DOD’s mission and 
strategic goals 
• In April 2006 DoD began implementing NSPS and converted approx. 11,000 non-bargaining unit 
employees, followed by 66,000 in Oct 2006 through Feb 2007, this spring an additional 35,000 will 
transition to NSPS: for a total of approx 113,000 employees. 
• Initial 11,000 employees recently completed the first appraisal cycle under performance management 
systems.  Both supervisors and employees expressed the need for more training. 
 
Apr 23 – Rep. Michael Turner (R-Ohio) introduces HR 2007 to “amend title 5, US Code, to provide that the NSPS 
shall not apply with respect to certain laboratories within DoD.” 
• Co-sponsors Reps: Frank Wolf (R-Virginia); Dave Hobson (R-Ohio); Jim Moran, (D-Virginia); and John 
Boehner (R-Ohio). 
• Referred to the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee. 
 
May 1 – OPM provides their completed assessment report of NSPS 
 
May 3 – US Fed News article: “CPAC Meeting the Challenges of NSPS” 
• Civilian Personnel Advisory Center has been training NSPS since Aug 2006. Trained more than 1,916 
employees and 582 supervisors in Spirals 1.2, 1.3. 
• Soon Spiral 2 will begin and training will continue. 
 
May 4 – AFGE radio show (“Inside Government”) features Mark Roth, AFGE General Counsel who discusses the 
NSPS, the Federal Labor Relations Authority, and AFGE’s Legal Rights Attorney Program. 
 
May 8 – House Armed Services readiness subcommittee voted to roll back contentious workplace changes planned 
for DoD.  Readiness Subcommittee Chairman Solomon Ortiz issues statement on subcommittee’s decision on the 
National Defense Authorization Act FY 08 (HR 1585). 
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• About 114,000 non-union workers have been converted to new system. 
 
May 16 – OMB Issues statement of Administration policy regarding HR 1585.  The Administration has “a number of 
significant concerns” with the bill.  Administration strongly opposes section 1106, which would significantly change 
NSPS. 
 
May 18 —The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit released its decision in AFGE vs. 
Gates (formerly AFGE v. Rumsfeld) regarding the adverse actions, appeals, and labor relations portions of NSPS.  
• The Court reversed the judgment of the District Court and upheld all aspects of the regulations in the 
appeal. One of the judges from the 3 member panel issued a dissenting opinion. 
• Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh, who filed the majority opinion, called the law that established NSPS a 
“statutory puzzle.” 
 
May 18—AFGE lobbies Senate to severely modify or eradicate NSPS. 
 
May 24— Senate panel approves language that would significantly limit the implementation of NSPS.  
• In a markup of the fiscal 2008 Defense authorization bill  the Senate Armed Services Committee voted to 
repeal the existing authority of the Defense Department to move forward on the labor relations portions 
of NSPS. 
• The House approved similar language the previous week. The Senate provision would permit Defense to 
continue developing a pay-for-performance system, as long as such a system is consistent with existing 
federal labor relations law. 
 
May 25 –AFGE radio program (“Inside Government”) has AFGE national President, John Gage; General Counsel, 
Mark Roth; and Legislative and Political Director Beth Moten to discuss AFGE’s next steps in fighting NSPS.  The 
program also includes Sen. Patty Murray (D-Wash.) to address NSPS and issues facing veterans. 
 
Jun 4-8 – PEO conducts a Senior Leaders Workshop in Columbus, Ohio.   
• Approximately 300 senior civilian and military leaders attend from units converting to NSPS.  Technical 
and policy staff of the PEO, Deputy Undersecretary for Civilian Personnel Policy, and the Civilian Personnel 
Management Service (CPMS) also attend.   
 
Jul 2 – Union coalition files a petition for rehearing before the U.S. District Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia.  
 
Jul 16 – GAO Report (GAO-07-851) released.  Derek B. Steward (Director, Defense Capabilities and Management) 
issues statement to Congress. 
• Important for DoD and Congress to be aware of the total (direct and indirect) costs of implementing NSPS. 
• NSPS is essential for DoD because, if implemented successfully, it could serve as a model for government-
wide human capital transformation. 
• DOD’s Nov 2005 estimate that it will cost $158 million to implement NSPS between 2005 and 2008 does 
not include full costs that DoD expects to incur as a result of implementing the new system. ($158M 
estimate includes $51M for PEO and $107M for the military services’ and Washington HQs Services’ NSPS 
management offices. DOES NOT include all direct costs (full salary costs of all civilian and military 
personnel who directly support NSPS activities department-wide) AND DOES NOT include any of the 
typical indirect costs associated with the design and implementation of NSPS (general administrative 
services, general research and technical support, rent, and operating and maintenance costs for buildings, 
equipment, and utilities. 
• Before developing its estimate, DoD did not fully define all the direct and indirect costs needed to manage 
NSPS. 
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• PEO required service components to estimate costs in several broad cost categories resulting in Depts of 
Army, Navy and Air Force and Washing HQS using different approaches to estimate NSPS funding 
requirements. 
• Without accurate cost estimates, Congress and DoD cannot contrast and compare or otherwise evaluate 
implementation costs: DoD and Congress DO NOT have adequate visibility over the actual costs to design 
and implement NSPS. 
• DoD has not established an effective oversight mechanism to ensure that all costs are fully captured in the 
components’ official accounting systems. 
• GAO recommends that DoD define ALL direct and indirect costs needed to manage NSPS, prepare a 
revised estimate of these implementation costs in accordance with the established definitions and federal 
financial accounting standards, and develop comprehensive oversight framework to ensure that all funds 
expended or obligated to design and implement NSPS are fully captured and reported. 
 
Jul 20 – AFGE Radio program (“Inside Government”) discusses NSPS with AFGE National Secretary-Treasurer J. 
David Cox. 
 
Jul 23 – The Department of Justice files an opposition to the union coalition petition for rehearing on behalf of DoD 
and OPM.    
 
Aug 4 – US Reps Jay Inslee (D-Wash.), Walter Jones (R-N.C.), and Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) introduce an 
amendment to FY08 Defense Appropriation bill that would block funding for DoD’s proposed personnel system.  
Added by voice vote. 
• Van Hollen says: “our concern is that the DoD has not implemented the law consistent with Congressional 
intent. 
• Third effort underway to rein in NSPS.  House Armed Service passed a version that the White House called 
“ in essence a total revocation” of the new system. The Senate Armed Services Committee’s version of the 
bill would ensure full bargaining rights for unions and would exempt blue-collar employees from NSPS. 
• DoD concerned that the House funding ban would probably impede other personnel programs at DoD, 
not just NSPS. 
• No House member spoke to support NSPS. 
 
Aug 10 – U.S. Court of Appeals for District of Columbia denies a motion filed by the AFGE and UDWC for an en banc 
(or full court) review of the Court’s May 18 decision.   
 
Aug 13 – Initial GAO meeting with PEO is held to discuss review of adequate safeguards to ensure fairness and lack 
of abuse under NSPS. 
 
Aug 23 – Union coalition files an appeal of U.S. Court of Appeals August 10 denial   
 
Aug 23 –NSPS web-based tool (the Performance Appraisal Application) has been updated with several 
improvement that should make it easier to navigate and more user-friendly. 
 
 Sep 7 – DepSecy Gordon England announces in a memorandum that for January 2008 the 110,000 DoD employees 
who are Spiral 1 of NSPS, half of January’s government-wide pay increase will be used to adjust base salaries of 
those with an acceptable performance rating, and half will be added to performance pay pools and distributed 
based on performance.  For January 2009, NSPS all of the GPI will be used in the pay pool for NSPS employees – no 
pay increase for employees who score a 1. 
 
Sep 17 - The U.S. Court of Appeals lifts its injunction against the labor relations, adverse actions, and employee 
appeals portions of NSPS.    
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Oct 10 – Members of Congress Republicans Frank Wolf, Thomas Davis III, and Democrat James P. Morgan, Jr. write 
letter of DOD Secy Gates.  The letter expressed concern over the September 7 memo’s announcement to the 
transition to performance pay. 
• The primary concern is that their constituents who now face this GPI cut “reportedly were informed from 
the outset that for the first year in the NSPS they would at least receive their base pay increase.” 
 
Oct 14 – Spiral 2.1 commences implementation.  
 
Oct 31—DoD announces that about 75,000 civilian employees will transfer into NSPS by March 2009 bringing the 
total number of employees under the system to 184,000. 
• 18,000 will convert before January, and more than 56,900 will follow them by end of March 2009. 
• Lacey explained that concerns about workload and business operations has delayed the transfer of an 
additional 32,000 DoD employees.  Instead of spring, they may transfer late next year. 
 
Dec 7 – House-Senate negotiators unveil the NSPS compromise in legislation that would restore collective 
bargaining rights to unions at DoD, and permit the Pentagon to go forward with new pay rules.  (12/10/2007 
Washington Post) (12/12/2007 US Fed News) 
• Would guarantee that NSPS employees receive 60 percent of the annual pay raise that most other 
government workers get. The remaining 40 percent would be used for performance raises. 
• Permit the unions and Pentagon to agree to “national level bargaining” where department-wide policies 
could be settled in talks attended by all union reps.  It also permits unions to bargain over implementation 
of new rules at the local level. 
• Does not allow unions to bargain over pay, and would deny pay to those employees that receive an 
unacceptable job performance rating. 
• Part of the FY08 Defense Authorization Act 
• NSPS changes have bipartisan support and predicted acceptance by White House 
• John Gage (AFGE), Gregory J. Jenemann (IFPTE) and Ron Ault (MTD-AFL-CIO) have all said the compromise 
is acceptable and that the unions don’t see NSPS lasting much longer (claiming victory). 
 
Dec 31—Secy England changes NSPS pay policy to reflect the FY2008 Defense Authorization Bill Senate-House 
compromise.  Employees covered by NSPS will receive 60 percent of the base salary increase that will be received 
by GS employees, and the remaining 40 percent of the raise will depend on job evaluations. 
• Most federal employees under GS will see an average raise of 3.5% (2.5% increase in base pay and 1 
percent locality pay supplement) 
• Officials used website to post NSPS will be eligible for 1.5 percent raise, a 1 percent raise tied to their job 
performance and a 1 percent locality pay supplement that will mirror the GS geographic-based payments.  
Employees who are rated “unacceptable” will see no adjustment to their salary. (Jan 4 2008 Washington 
Post) 
• 2008 NSPS pay scales effective Jan 6 (Jan 8 2008, Regulatory Intelligence Data) 
• 60/40 split will remain for 2009 
 
2008 
Jan 6 – 2008 NSPS pay schedules effective: 60/40 schedule 
 
Jan 7 – AFGE files a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court.  The government’s response is due in March 2008. 
 
Jan 28 - President Bush Signs H.R. 4986, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008 into 
law. The FY 2008 NDAA retained basic authorities for NSPS pay for performance and other human resources 
matters, but imposed government-wide rules for adverse actions, employee appeals, labor-management relations, 
and workforce shaping.  
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Jan 29 – AFGE drops its legal challenge to NSPS.  John Gage says that the 2008 Defense Authorization Act, which 
the President signed, contains all the changes to the NSPS that AFGE sought. “we got everything we’re suing for, 
this is a good day for AFGE and DoD employee” (Jan 29 Federal Times). “There are not many wins in our history 
bigger than this one” (January 30, Washington Post) 
 
Feb12 – Committee on House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, Postal 
Service, and the District of Columbia hears testimony from John Gage (AFGE), Gregory Junemann(IFPT),Carol 
Bonosaro (Senior Executive Association), Prof. Charles Tiefer (Baltimore Law), Prof. Charles Fay (Rutgers) on the 
merits and potential of pay for performance as an HR model in the Federal Government.   
 
Feb 27 – Under Secy Chu testifies before the Committee on Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Personnel to 
discuss FY 2009 Defense Authorization. 
 
Mar 11 – PEO announces that DoD expects to start bringing its first bargaining-unit employees under NSPS by fall 
2009. (March 12 Federal Times). 
 
Apr 22 – Secy Gates Announces Bradley B. Bunn, director, Civilian Personnel Management Service, is to be 
reassigned to the PEO NSPS. 
 
May 11 – Secy Gordon England names Brad Bunn to succeed Mary Lacey as the PEO NSPS. (May 27, Washington 
Post) 
 
May 12 – At the Excellence in Government conference in Washington DC, Secy Chu argued that pay reforms will 
continue and pointed to the fact that while congressional Democrats altered portions of NSPS in the FY 2008 
Authorization Act, they did not repeal the system as evidence that Congress wants reform. 
• Secy Chu and OPM Director Linda Springer said they believe both parties recognize that linking pay raises 
and bonuses to employee’s performance is necessary to allow the government to compete with the 
private sector for talented employees. (March 12 Federal Times) 
 
May 22 – DoD and OPM issue proposed regulations, as directed by Congress, revising NSPS.  The Proposed 
regulation governs compensation, classification and performance management under NSPS.  Specifically (Public 
Law 110-181) would: 
• Bring NSPS under government-wide labor-management relations rues 
• Excludes Federal Wage System (blue collar) employees from coverage under NSPS 
• Requires DoD to collectively bargain procedures and appropriate arrangements for brining DoD 
bargaining unit employees under NSPS prior to conversion of these employees 
• Brings NSPS under government-wide rules for disciplinary actions and employee appeals of adverse 
actions 
• Brings NSPS under government-wide rules for workforce shaping (reduction in force, furlough, and 
transfer of function) 
• Requires that this rule be considered a major rule for the purposes of section 801 of title 5, USC, with 
advance Congressional notification for OPM/DoD jointly-prescribed NSPS regulations 
• Gives these rules the status of government-wide rules for the purpose of collective bargaining under 
chapter 71 when these rules are uniformly applicable to all organizational of functional units included in 
NSPS.  
 
May 27-30 – Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the 
District of Colombia holds a series of meetings in Hawaii to discuss recent proposals to phase-out non-foreign 
COLA and phase-in locality pay for federal employees in Hawaii, Alaska and the US territories. 
• May 29 Bradley Bunn, PEO NSPS, participates in Panel I to discuss the effects of the COLA changes on 
NSPS (See testimony May 29, 2008 “Non-foreign Cost of Living Allowance”) 
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Jul 22 – Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee: Subcommittee on Oversight of 
Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Colombia meet: “Improving Performance: A 
Review of Pay-for-Performance Systems in the Federal Government.” 
• OPM Director Linda M. Springer testified on the positive impact of pay-for-performance in the federal 
government. 
• PEO-NSPS Bunn testified that NSPS is working and that the DoD is seeing a “powerful return on 
investment.” 
• John Gage, AFGE, testified. 
 
Sep – GAO-08-773 released and concludes that employees are generally not positive about NSPS: “employees who 
had the most experience under NSPS showed a negative movement in their perceptions” (40% in 2006 were 
positive, 23 % in 2007). 
 
Sep 16 – Presidential Candidate Barack Obama responds to letter from Gregory Junemann (International 
Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers).   
• Obama largely agrees with Junemann’s criticisms of NSPS and concludes that if/when elected President 
he will “substantially revise these NSPS regulations, and strongly consider a complete repeal.” 
 
Sep 26 – DoD releases final NSPS regulations, published in the Sept. 26 Federal Register. The core features of the 
personnel system remain intact, but regulations conform to the NDAA FY2008. 
 
Oct 9 – OPM final rule on NSPS sent to House: received by House Oversight and Government Reform Committee. 
 
Oct 14 – GAO memo to Senators Lieberman, Susan M. Collins, Carl Levin, John McCain, Reps Henry Waxman, 
Thomas Davis III, Ike Skelton and Duncan Hunter discusses the DoD and OPM final rules of NSPS. NDAA 2008 
required that rules implementing NSPS be treated as major rules under the Congressional Review Act. (GAO-09-
84R) 
 
Nov – Congressional Budget Office releases, “A Review of the Department of Defense’s National Security Personnel 
System,” a report requested by the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Readiness of the House Committee on 
Armed Services to determine if NSPS has been achieving its goals stated in NDAA FY2004. 
 
Nov – GAO-09-82 released, “Results-Oriented Management: Opportunities Exist for Refining the Oversight and 
Implementation of the Senior Executive Performance-Based Pay system.” 
• Concludes that while generally satisfied with OPM’s and OMB’s oversight, officials at the selected 
agencies said OPM could strengthen its communication with agencies and executive on how it uses the 
SES performance appraisal data…further communication from OPM is important.” 
 
Dec 3 – DoD and OPM issue a proposed regulation adding subpart E, staffing and Employment to the NSPS 
regulation published in the Federal Register on Sept 26, 2008. 
 
Dec 19 – “To increase the efficiency in filling civilian vacancies, effective Jan 1, selecting officials will have 45 days 
instead of 90 to choose the best-qualified candidate…  The 90-day rule was put in place in June 2007 to ease the 
transition into the NSPS. A review of policy showed managers were more comfortable with the system and could 
make the decision in 45 days or less…hiring officials also are encouraged to submit a personnel action as soon as 
they are aware there will be a vacancy” (Dec 19, 2008 Policy Update to Make Civilian Hiring Quicker). 
 
Dec 30 – Military personnel and civilian employees under both the General Schedule and NSPS pay plans are 
receiving raises.  Civilians under the GS system get an across-the-board pay raise of 2.9 percent in 2009.  Civilians 
under NSPS will see an increase of 1.74 percent and can earn additional performance-based salary increases 
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through the NSPS “pay pool” process.  All civilian employees rate a locality pay that for 2009 range from about 
13.86 percent to 34.35 percent of an employee’s base pay. 
 
2009 
Jan 16 – DoD issues final rules to expand hiring and promotion flexibilities available to managers under NSPS.  The 
rules are published in the January 16 Federal Register. 
 
Jan 20 – President Barack Obama sworn into office. Memo issued from White House freezing all programs from 
previous Administration whose regulations have either not been published or not been implemented until the 
Administration could review each policy. 
 
Feb 11 – Letter from Congressmen Skelton and Ortiz to Secretary Gates stressing that NSPS be frozen until further 
review by the Administration and Congress. 
 
Feb 11 – OPM report released. Concluded that while DoD laid a strong foundation for NSPS implementation it was 
still unpopular among employees and cause mistrust between supervisors and employees. 
 
March 16 – Deputy Secretary of Defense Lynn announces that DoD and OPM will initiate a complete and joint 
review of NSPS. 
 
April 3 – Letter from eight Democratic Congressional leaders to OPM Director Orszag urging that the 
Administration freeze all pay-for-performance programs across the Federal government. 
 
May 14 – OPM Director John Berry announces that the Defense Business Board was asked to form a task group to 
review NSPS. 
 
May 29 – Orszag responds to Congressional letter and says that the Administration does not feel that it is 
necessary to freeze all pay-for-performance programs across the government.  The Administration Administration 
“will not support any pay system that is unfair or has the effect of suppressing wages or discriminating 
against employees.” 
 
June – Representative Carol Shea-Porter introduced amendment to the NDAA FY 2010 that moved towards 
repealing NSPS authorization. 
 
August 25 – Task Group releases report with seven recommendations for the Department to reconstruct NSPS. 
 
September – Department announces that all employees, regardless of pay schedule, will receive same salary 
adjustments provided for GS employees. 
 
Oct 7 – Conference report released on final legislation for NDAA FY 2010 calling for the repeal of the law that 
authorized NSPS and mandating all employees who had been converted to NSPS to be reconverted to the GS by 
January 1, 2012. 
Oct 28 – President Obama signs NDAA FY 2010 and sets six month timetable for DoD to plan how to revert more 
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“National Security Personnel System Pre-Collaboration Labor 
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